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DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY 
Thomas D. Haley* 
Abstract: B ine e  inel  l e  mi e indi id al  i a e inf ma i n, i h e l  
that can be devastating. Federal courts often leave those individuals without legal recourse by 
dismissing their lawsuits for lack of standing, even though plaintiffs in these cases provide 
stronger showings of harm than courts usually require. Using an original data set, this Article 
shows how standing analysis in these cases has gone awry and argues that the standing inquiry 
in da  da a-protection cases harms both public policy and standing doctrine. 
This Article makes three contributions to literatures in federal courts and privacy. First, it 
shows that current federal court practice too often allows data collectors to cause harm without 
penalty. Data collectors from theme parks and grocery stores to Equifax and Google
routinely collect private information improperly and inadequately protect the data they collect. 
This Article unpacks the various ways federal courts get standing wrong in the lawsuits that 
follow, such as by focusing on the particular scraps of information collected or lost via data 
b each  find lain iff  ha e n  ffe ed an inj  in fac .  Sec nd, hi  A icle d a  n an 
original data set of 217 federal data-protection decisions to demonstrate systemic pressures 
that lead federal courts to misapply standing doctrine in data-protection litigation. Existing 
scholarship focuses on analyzing a handful of leading appellate cases and therefore misses the 
f ll c e f fede al c  eeming h ili  a d da a-protection lawsuits. Third, by 
bringing to light systemic issues that have not been considered in this context, this Article 
e  change   fede al c  a ach  anding in hese cases that will help align the 
incentives and costs of data collection and help to develop a robust body of federal law on 
issues of data protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Six Flags theme parks require fingerprint scans from children.1 Both 
Facebook and Google run facial recognition on user-uploaded photos to 
identify the subjects of other photos.2 History shows that none of these 
companies can be counted on to keep that data private; neither can the 
federal courts be counted on to hear the lawsuits that follow. This Article 
shows how standing doctrine an important but under-explored factor in 
data-protection litigation prevents plaintiffs from prevailing in lawsuits, 
                                                     
1. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197 (sustaining lawsuit arising 
nde  he Illin i  Bi me ic Inf ma i n P i ac  Ac  ( BIPA )). 
2. Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (sustaining lawsuit alleging this 
practice violated BIPA); Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing for 
lack of standing lawsuit alleging similar claims). 
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leaving them unprotected and federal laws unenforced. To do so, this 
Article draws on empirical analysis of hundreds of hand-collected federal 
decisions on standing. 
E e  da , b ine e  c llec  eam  f indi id al  e nal da a. 
Businesses use biometric identifiers like fingerprints and retinal scans 
ubiquitously for tasks as mundane as time tracking.3 But in both collection 
and brokerage, businesses routinely violate laws meant to protect 
indi id al  i ac . Si  Flag , f  e am le, e i e  ea n a h lde  
to give up their fingerprints to park security and to scan their fingerprints 
each time they visit the park. While this data collection may help protect 
he heme a k  c n je el 4 from wily teenagers sharing a single 
ea n a , Si  Flag  ac i n  al  i la e Illin i  Bi me ic Inf ma i n 
Privacy Act.5 Other businesses also routinely disregard federal statutes. 
Numerous cable companies have violated the Cable Communications 
P lic  Ac  (CCPA) data destruction requirements by illegally keeping 
f me  c me  ec d  f  ea  af e  e mination of the 
customer relationship.6 
Yet federal judges have been strangely hesitant to open the courthouse 
doors to plaintiffs in these cases. Even where defendants have clearly 
acted illegally, federal courts routinely dismiss data-protection lawsuits 
for lack of standing.7 Drawing on analysis of a hand-collected dataset of 
over 200 federal data protection cases, this Article shows that factors 
including overreliance on inapplicable precedent and drift from the 
purposes of standing doctrine drive these decisions. The Article then 
proposes solutions for those problems. 
To gain access to federal court, a plaintiff must establish that they have 
Article III standing by satisfying a three-part test that, in theory, applies 
equally to all types of cases.8 In the United States S eme C  c en  
                                                     
3. See, e.g., McGinnis v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (dismissing 
for lack of standing lawsuit arising from fingerprint time-tracking). 
4. See, e.g.,  Raging  Bull,  SIX  FLAGS  GREAT  AM., 
https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/attractions/raging-bull  [https://perma.cc/E9E2-B5YL] 
(asking Do You Have What It Takes to Tame the Bull? ); Giant Drop, SIX FLAGS GREAT AM., 
https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/attractions/giant-drop  [https://perma.cc/H545-LXD5] 
(allegedly Taking Screams to New Heights ).  
5. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2019) (setting forth restrictions on collection of biometric 
information).  
6. See, e.g., Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (dismissing CCPA 
lawsuit for lack of standing); Braitberg v. Charter Commc ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(same). 
7. See Gubala, 846 F.3d 909; Braitberg, 836 F.3d 925. 
8. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (holding that A icle III of the Constitution 
c nfine  he fede al c   adj dica ing ac al ca e  and c n e ie .  . . . The Art[icle] III 
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conception, the crux of that inquiry is whether a plaintiff has suffered an 
inj  in fac  a  he hand  f he defendan ; ha  i , a ha m ha  i  
fficien l  c nc e e  and a ic la i ed. 9 Modern standing doctrine 
has primarily developed in the context of hot-button issues, including 
environmental protection,10 religious schooling,11 same-sex marriage,12 
and government surveillance.13 This heritage proves an unsteady 
foundation for recent developments in data-protection litigation, where 
the ethereal nature of data and the possibility of harm that might flow from 
its loss lead the courts to additional philosophical questions. If an 
employee clocks in and out with her fingerprint but does not receive 
statutorily mandated information about retention of that fingerprint, is she 
ha med? If Ube  le  a hacke  eal a d i e  name, licen e n mbe , bank 
account number, and bank routing number, may the driver sue before the 
hacke  e  he d i e  iden i ?14 As a result, courts applying the same 
Supreme Court precedent in the data-protection context have reached 
                                                     
doctrine that requires a li igan   ha e anding   in ke he e  f a fede al c  i  e ha  
he m  im an  doctrine of justiciability). 
9. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (vacating and 
remanding lawsuit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for additional analysis of the concreteness of 
plaintiff s alleged harm). 
10. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (dismissing for lack of standing lawsuit 
under citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act). 
11. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (dismissing for lack of 
standing lawsuit challenging state s provision of tax credit to taxpayers contributing money to 
religious schools). 
12. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (holding private parties seeking to defend 
constitutionality of California s Proposition 8 lacked standing to do so where state declined to defend 
the proposition). 
13. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (dismissing for lack of standing lawsuit 
by attorneys, human rights workers, and other organizations challenging widespread surveillance 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). Richard Fallon argues that the Supreme Court s 
standing jurisprudence is inconsistently applied and depends on factors including the justices  
political views. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 
1096 (2015) (noting that [ ]i h he R be  C , a  i h edece  Courts, it is possible to 
distinguish judicial conservatives from liberals and to characterize some standing rulings as having 
ei he  a libe al  a c n e a i e alence ). S ch c nce n  a e n  ne Gene Nichol, for example, 
deemed the inconsistency of standing j i dence adicall  n a i f ing.  Gene R. Nich l, J ., 
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2002) (arguing that 
anding anal i  ema icall  fa  he e f l e  he e le ). 
14. Put another way, Seth Kreimer has likened disagreement over the sufficiency of informational 
injuries to early skepticism about the theory of quantum mechanics. See Seth F. Kreimer, S ook  
Action at a Distance : In angible Inj  in Fac  in he Info ma ion Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 
751 52 (2016) (a g ing ha  inf ma i nal inj ie  fa all  nde mine an acc n  f A icle III that 
in i  n di ec ,  angible,  and al able  inj ie   h ical r economic interests as the ticket of 
admi i n  he fede al c h e, and f ndl  al e  n i n  f a ic la i ed  and imminen  
inj ). 
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results that are divergent, if not irreconcilable. 
Normatively, whether isolated instances of improper data collection or 
data loss should suffice for standing is a contested issue. Many scholars 
have argued, emphatically, yes, with contentions ranging from broad 
theories of probabilistic standing to specific examples of courts treating 
privacy harms with unwarranted exceptionalism.15 But many federal 
courts seem to disagree. Judicial reticence to recognize harm in data-
protection litigation contributes to rampant, judicially approved, 
consequence-free lawbreaking by businesses, which continue to 
improperly collect, store, trade, and lose valuable private information. 
Along the way, at every level of the federal judicial system, courts have 
departed from prevailing formulations of standing doctrine, subverted the 
j ifica i n  f  he d c ine  e i ence, and engaged f eel  in 
speculation about the nature and extent of data-protection harms.16 
This Article bridges the gap between theory and reality in explaining 
fede al c  el c ance  en e ain da a-protection lawsuits. Part I 
shows that federal courts have departed from traditional conceptions of 
standing doctrine and its underlying purposes in data-protection litigation, 
to the detriment of individual litigants and the judicial system. While the 
scholarly literature advocates the normative position that the courts have 
gone astray, it is limited by its reliance on a handful of leading cases that 
                                                     
15. In general, for example, Jonathan Nash has argued for taking a present-value approach to 
probabilistic standing. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283 
(2013) (proposing expected-value analysis as basis for assessing injury-in-fact and redressability 
prongs of standing inquiry). Andrew Hessick has similarly argued against requiring a high risk of 
harm to establish standing as unsupported by Article III. See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic 
Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012) ( A icle III does not impose a minimum risk-
e i emen . ). In he ecific c n e  f da a ec i n, Danielle Ci n and Daniel S l e a g e 
that increased risk of identity theft and anxiety about the consequences of data breach resemble a 
variety of harms in other contexts that have been held enough to satisfy Article III. See Daniel J. 
Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
737, 744 (2018) ( [A]n ie  and i k, ge he  and al ne, de erve recognition as compensable 
ha m . ). Julie Cohen challenges the incoherent distinctions between data-protection cases and other 
types of litigation, as well as those between lawsuits arising from data breaches versus data gathering. 
See Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 
DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 548 (2017) (noting that, in contrast to the urgency with which data breaches 
a e ea ed, he e a e n  e ed in e e  in c ea ing a c m a able en e f eme gency about processes 
that underlie a multibillion-d lla  ind ). Feli  W  e l e  he a  in hich i ac  li iga i n 
ha  changed c  a ach  anding a  he m  f ndamen al le el . See Felix T. Wu, How 
Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439 (2017) ( Whe ea  lde  anding ca e  
focused on whether the plaintiff before the court was the right plaintiff, the newer privacy-based cases 
are focused on, or making assumptions about, whether or not the harm caused by the defendant is the 
igh  kind f ha m. ). 
16. Indeed, Wu argues that the federal courts are engaged in usurpation of the legislative branch s 
powers in the realm of data protection. See Wu, supra note 15, at 458. 
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leaves the extent of the problem unclear. Part II reveals how serious the 
problem of standing in data-protection litigation has become and, in doing 
so, provides empirical support for existing critiques of federal courts  
handling of these cases. Drawing on analysis of over 200 federal decisions 
on standing in data-protection cases,17 this Part identifies potential drivers 
f he c  c i  deci i n-making. Among other conclusions, this 
analysis shows that courts rely  hea il  n he S eme C  2013 
decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA18 and appear to analyze 
standing from the wrong starting point. Finally, Part III discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications of correcting these errors. 
Theoretically, it argues that standing doctrine requires a more nuanced 
approach than the mechanical application of the one-size-fits-all test 
currently employed by courts. Practically, it explores ways to put the 
courts back on course and the benefits that would flow from allowing 
more data-protection lawsuits to advance to determination on the merits. 
I. THE LIMITS OF MODERN STANDING DOCTRINE IN DATA-
PROTECTION CASES 
Standing doctrine arises from the United States Constitution. Article III 
provides that [ ]he j dicial P e  hall e end  ce ain, en me a ed 
e  f Ca e  and C n e ie . 19 When there is no Case or 
Controversy, the judicial power does not exist, and the court must dismiss 
the case. From this straightforward foundation rises an area of law of 
paramount importance and complexity.20 
In later Parts, this Article shows how doctrinal drift from the purposes 
of standing doctrine occurred in data-protection cases and why it is vitally 
important to refocus the doctrine. This Part sets the stage. Section I.A. 
provides a brief overview of the state of standing doctrine in data-
protection litigation. Section I.B. highlights how standing doctrine has 
failed to adapt to these cases and particularly the types of harms 
underlying them. 
                                                     
17. This dataset represents a substantially complete set of data-protection standing cases decided 
after the Supreme Court s influential decision in Clapper. 
18. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).  
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
20. The Framers declined to define either Case  or Controversy  or to leave much recorded 
discussion on what they meant. As Chief Justice Warren put it, h e  d  ha e an icebe g 
quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very 
heart of our constitutional form of g e nmen .  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 94 (1968) (holding 
that taxpayers had standing to seek injunction against government spending on materials for use in 
religious schools).  
 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
2020] DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY 1199 
 
A. Standing in Data-Protection Litigation 
Standing is a threshold, jurisdictional requirement in any federal case. 
To cross that threshold, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test. They must 
show first, that they suffered an injury-in-fact; second, that the injury is 
traceable to the defendant; and third, that the injury is redressable by a 
favorable decision.21 For all that the courts emphasize the constitutional 
nature of standing doctrine, in fact, the Constitution does not refer to 
standing. Rather, the doctrine is purely a judge-made interpretation of 
Article III  Ca e  and C n e ie  i i n. The d c ine  
amorphous character has led to inconsistent results that underscore the 
difficulties in its application.22 
1. The Purposes of Standing Doctrine 
Judges developed standing doctrine in service of two primary goals: 
maintaining the separation of powers and ensuring that cases are 
adversarial in nature.23 
First, standing prevents the judiciary from encroaching on the 
responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches. Where a 
plaintiff has suffered no injury, or their injury is not traceable to the 
conduct of the defendant, suspicion arises that the plaintiff may be using 
the judicial system to address a political grievance a grievance that 
                                                     
21. This is a slight simplification of the test prescribed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lujan v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 61 (1992) ( O e  he ea ,  ca e  ha e e abli hed ha  he 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have 
ffe ed an inj  in fac an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
a ic la i ed and (b) ac al  imminen , n  c njec al   h he ical.  Sec nd, he e m  
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of the injury has to be 
fai l  . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
inde enden  ac i n f me hi d a  n  bef e he c .  Thi d, i  m  be likel ,  a  ed  
merel  ec la i e,  ha  he inj  ill be ed e ed b  a fa able deci i n.  (citations omitted)). 
22. Thus, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that [ ]a  f he diffic l  in gi ing eci e 
meaning and form to the concept of justiciability stems from the uncertain historical antecedents of 
the case-and-c n e  d c ine.  Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 96. 
23. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 694 (2004) ( The e i n f hich a ie  ma  e l  c me  c   
vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of standing. In trying to address 
that question, American courts have traditionally drawn partly upon general principles of 
jurisprudence and partly upon distinctively American ideas about popular sovereignty, limited 
government, and the separation of powers. ); see also Hessick, supra note 15, at 56 ( Courts cannot 
decide legal questions in the abstract based on hypothetical disputes. As the Supreme Court has told 
us, the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III limits the federal judiciary to resolving legal 
e i n  nl  in he c n e  f ed e ing  e en ing an ac al   h ea ened inj  e l ing 
from violations of the law. ). 
 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
1200 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1193 
 
should be addressed by the elected branches of government.24 This 
justification has clear appeal. Fairchild v. Hughes25 is a paradigmatic case. 
In that case, plaintiff Charles Fairchild, a New York businessman, sued to 
restrain the government from enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment, 
which prohibits the government from denying citizens the right to vote on 
the basis of sex.26 Fai child  he  f he ca e a  ained,   i  
charitably. He argued that the Secretary of State was on the verge of 
proclaiming the Nineteenth Amendment valid.27 This, in turn, meant that 
the Attorney General could soon be called upon to enforce it.28 Fairchild 
alleged there were questions about the validity of the process of the 
Amendmen  a age h gh a e legi la e .29 Thus, if the Secretary 
of State and Attorney General did what he predicted, they would mislead 
state election officials into permitting women to vote, thereby 
e en [ing] a ce ainmen  f he i he  f he legall  alified 
e . 30 The Supreme Court denied standing, recognizing this as a 
politically-motivated and convoluted attempt by a private litigant to 
coerce the judiciary into stepping outside its role in the constitutional 
structure.31 
Second, standing is necessary for the functioning of the adversarial 
system employed by the federal courts. That system relies primarily on 
opposing parties with enough at stake in the dispute to ensure that all 
relevant evidence, law, and argument on any given issue is put before the 
judge.32 This ad e a ial em  j ifica i n f  anding d c ine i  a  
least as appealing as the separation of powers. It is easy to see that legal 
                                                     
24. See, e.g., Clapper . Amne  In l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (n ing ha  [ ]he la  f 
Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial 
process from being used to usu  he e  f he li ical b anche ). J ice P ell cha ac e i ed 
anding a  nece a   e en  he e f he j dicial em f  am h  gene al e i i n f 
he e a i n  f g e nmen .  United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (opining that expanding the judicial power to taxpayer suits would work to the detriment 
of the federal judicial system). 
25. 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ( The igh  f ci i en  f he Uni ed S a e   e hall n  be denied 
 ab idged b  he Uni ed S a e   b  an  a e n acc n  f e . ).  
27. Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 127 28. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 127. 
30. Id. at 128. 
31. Id. at 129. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (e lling he clea  c nc e eness 
provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of 
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and 
demanding in e e ). 
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precedent created on an issue being argued by parties who lacked 
sufficient incentive to put on their best case may be flawed.33 By closing 
the courthouse doors in these instances, standing doctrine helps to 
preserve the benefits of an adversarial, common-law judicial system. 
However, neither of these justifications applies to all types of cases. 
Lawsuits between private parties typically implicate the adversarial 
justification but have little to do with the separation of powers. Johnson 
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,34 a recent district court case, provides an 
example. Johnson a e f m Uni ed  e i emen  ha  J hn n, a 
baggage handler, use his fingerprints to clock in and out of work.35 United, 
in violation of a statute, did not disclose its data-retention practices or 
obtain consent from Johnson and his coworkers to collect their biometric 
information.36 This dispute does not raise any separation-of-powers 
concerns. It is for the courts to adjudicate whether a defendant has violated 
law and in doing so harmed a plaintiff. But questions might linger whether 
plaintiffs have enough at stake in such a case to put forth meaningful 
argument and evidence. In Johnson, plaintiff alleged only that he and his 
colleagues were deprived of notice and disclosure mandated by a statute.37 
Whether that gave him enough of a stake in the dispute to put forth a 
serious case is less clear than, for instance, a claim that defective 
equipment caused a suitcase to fall on him. 
Despite the lack of overlap in the leading justifications for standing 
doctrine, the Supreme Court mandates a one-size-fits-all inquiry. It is no 
surprise, then, that the federal courts have struggled to consistently apply 
he e . Tha  lack f c n i enc  manife  in he c  a ied ea men  
of cases depending on the context in which they arise.38 The burgeoning 
area of data-protection litigation is a prime example. 
2. Confounding Strains of Data-Protection Litigation 
Various factors in data-protection litigation further complicate the 
standing inquiry. Imagine a typical data breach: hackers have stolen data 
from millions of consumers stored by, say, an online retailer. But what 
types of data? How much? What can the hackers reasonably be expected 
                                                     
33. Examples of federal courts doing exactly that in data-protection litigation are discussed in 
section II.B. 
34. No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2018). 
35. Id. at *1. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at *3. 
38. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1071 80 (analyzing divergent standing analysis in cases 
arising in contexts such as the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and national 
security). 
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to do with the data? Have affected consumers seen signs of identity theft? 
If so, are they attributable to this hack, or any number of other hacks over 
the years? 
Still more confounding factors arise in cases where companies have 
improperly collected data but have not lost it. Cable companies, for 
instance, routinely retain personal information of former customers. The 
CCPA forbids this practice, but the customer has no reason to believe 
anybody other than the cable company has access to the information. Is 
the bare statutory violation enough of a harm to establish standing? 
Decisions on standing have turned on the answers to these questions, 
and the outcomes are not consistent. This Article identifies three leading 
categories of confounding factors present in data-protection litigation: the 
probabilistic harm strain, the intangible harm strain, and the 
temporal strain. 
a. The Probabilistic Harm Strain 
A common question in data-protection litigation is one of probabilities. 
Plaintiffs in these cases are worse off than they would have been had data 
collectors better secured their data, or not retained it beyond the period 
authorized by statute. But it is hard for judges or anyone to estimate 
precisely how much harm plaintiffs will suffer. A hacker might use stolen 
information to bring one plaintiff to absolute financial ruin; another 
lain iff  inf ma i n migh  ne e  be ed. The cable c m an  migh  
lose improperly retained information, subjecting the plaintiff to that same 
roll of the dice; but then, the company might never lose the data. 
Because probabilistic standing is at the heart of much data-protection 
litigation, Clapper, a case arising out of post-9/11 government 
surveillance, looms large over the analysis.39 There, respondents sued to 
enjoin NSA surveillance conducted under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978.40 Amendments to that Act permitted the NSA 
to surveil a target without demonstrating probable cause that the a ge  i  
a f eign e   agen  f a f eign e  and i h  ecif ing he 
nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which 
                                                     
39.  Cla e  . Amne  In l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). Other scholars pin much of the blame for 
judicial mishandling of privacy cases on the Clapper decision. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 
15, at 741 (noting ha  [i]n deci i n af e  deci i n, c  ha e elied n Clapper to dismiss data-
b each ca e ); see also id. a  744 (n ing ha  Clapper and Spokeo have led to confusion about how 
ha m  in l ing e nal da a h ld be c nce ali ed ). That contention finds substantial empirical 
support. See infra section II.A. 
40. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 406 07. 
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he elec nic eillance ill cc . 41 Respondents challenged the 
constitutionality of this statutory scheme. To support standing, they 
alleged ha  he e i  an bjec i el  ea nable likelih d ha  hei  
c mm nica i n  ill be ac i ed  b  NSA eillance and ha  he i k 
of surveillance . . . is so substantial that they have been forced to take 
costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their 
international communications. 42 
The Supreme Court, invoking the separation-of-powers justification,43 
ejec ed e nden  a g men . Wi h e ec   e nden  claimed 
future harm the bjec i el  ea nable likelih d  f c mm nica i n  
interception the Court held that for a future harm to be c nc e e  
en gh   anding, i  m  be ce ainl  im ending. 44 Writing 
for the majori , J ice Ali  cha ac e i ed e nden  a g men  a  a 
five-step chain of causation, which he deemed hei  highl  ec la i e 
fea . 45 In contrast, the dissent proceeded from the adversarial 
justification46 in contending that respondents established a sufficient 
probability of future harm to justify standing. 
In Part II, this Article analyzes hundreds of data-protection cases 
decided after Clapper to show, among other things, that Clapper has 
bec me a c e iece f he c  ea ning in da a-protection litigation. 
Numerous leading circuit court opinions in data-protection cases have 
discussed Clapper, usually extensively, in assessing standing.47 In the 
                                                     
41. Id. at 404. 
42. Id. at 407. 
43. Id. at 408 ( The la  f A icle III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, 
serves to prevent the j dicial ce  f m being ed   he e  f he li ical b anche . ). 
44. Id. at 409 10 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992)). 
45. Id. a  410 ( [R]e nden  a g men  e  n hei  highl  ec la i e fea  ha : (1) he 
Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they 
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a 
rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the 
[F eign In elligence S eillance C ] ill c ncl de ha  he G e nmen  ed eillance 
procedures satisfy § 1881a  man  afeg a d  and a e c n i en  i h he F h Amendmen ; (4) he 
G e nmen  ill cceed in in e ce ing he c mm nica i n  f e nden  c n ac ; and (5) 
respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Governmen  in e ce . ). 
46. S anding hel   en e ha  he legal e i n  e en ed  he fede al c  ill n  ake 
he f m f ab ac  in ellec al blem  e l ed in he a ified a m he e f a deba ing cie  
b  in ead h e e i n  ill be e en ed in a c nc e e fac al c n e  c nd ci e  a eali ic 
a ecia i n f he c n e ence  f j dicial ac i n.  Id. at 423 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). 
47. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 
F.3d 262, 267 68 (4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384, 388 (6th 
Cir. 2016); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 
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federal judicial system as a whole, of the 209 data-protection cases studied 
for this Article, 49% cited Clapper and that number rises to 69% of 
decisions finding that plaintiffs lacked standing.48 
But Clapper is the wrong foundation for conducting a standing inquiry 
in data-protection litigation for several reasons.49 Most substantially, it is 
a poor fit in that separation-of-powers concerns predominate: the case 
involves a claim against the government based on an allegedly 
unconstitutional statutory scheme50 and directly implicates issues of 
national security.51 In contrast, most data-protection cases involve private, 
non-governmental parties in disputes unrelated to such lofty issues. 
Clapper is not the only source of confusion. As a general rule, federal 
decisions on standing in data-protection litigation are not a model of 
clarity. The confusion goes all the way to the top, with the Supreme 
C  deci i n in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.52 There, Thomas Robins 
sought to bring a class-ac i n la i  again  he people search engine  
Spokeo for alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).53 
According to the complaint, Spokeo gathered and disseminated 
information about Robins such as that he was married with children, had 
a graduate degree, and was employed at a high-paying job.54 Unhappily 
for Robins, none of that was true.55 R bin  alleged ha  S ke  
inacc a e e ing i la ed he FCRA  e i emen  ha  en i ie  like 
Spokeo ensure the accuracy of their reporting, entitling Robins to an 
award of statutory damages.56 
                                                     
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015). 
48. More detailed empirical analysis of Clapper s impact on data-protection cases is set forth in 
Part II. 
49. Among them the fact that Justice Alito s casual dismissal of respondents  fears quickly proved 
to be so very wrong. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer & Patrick C. Toomey, How the Government Misled the 
Supreme Court on Warrantless Wiretapping, THE NATION (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-government-misled-supreme-court-warrantless-
wiretapping/ [https://perma.cc/GK3K-WE98] (discussing Edward Snowden s revelations about NSA 
wiretapping).  
50. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 ( In kee ing i h he e f [ anding] d c ine,  anding 
inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide 
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was 
unconstitutional. ). 
51. See id. at 409 ( [W]e ha e f en f nd a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has 
been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and 
f eign affai . ). 
52. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
53. Id. at 1544. 
54. Id. at 1546.  
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1545 (noting the FCRA requires that c n me  e ing agencie  . . . f ll  ea nable 
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R bin s difficulty arose from the fact that he asserted only a 
echnical  i la i n f he FCRA in other words, Spokeo violated a 
statute, but it was not clear that Robins was harmed by the violation. For 
the District Court, that was not enough to confer standing.57 The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed,58 and many commentators believed the Supreme 
C  b e en  g an  f ce i a i ld lead  a deci i n cla if ing 
standing issues in data-protection litigation.59 
The Supreme Court did not oblige. After reiterating the importance of 
standing doctrine to ensuring the separation of powers,60 the Court punted 
n he f ndamen al i e b  li ing he concrete and particularized  
element of the injury-in-fact test, holding that the Ninth Circuit did not 
e l  anal e he concreteness  f R bin s harm, and remanded for 
further consideration.61 As a result, Spokeo stands for little more than a 
reaffirmation that intangible harms can be sufficiently concrete to confer 
standing but provides no guidance on how to assess concreteness. 
b. The Intangible Harm Strain 
Perhaps the only point of agreement among the circuit courts is that 
actual evidence of identity theft closely following a data breach is 
actionable.62 But the more typical case involves harms that are much less 
tangible breach or improper collection has occurred, but identity theft 
has not yet been observed. Several circuits have denied standing in these 
                                                     
ced e   a e ma im m ible acc ac  f  c n me  e ,  and bjec  an  e n 
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the FCRA] with respect to any 
indi id al  . . . [ ] ei he  ac al damage   a  damage  f $100  $1,000 e  i la i n, c  
f he ac i n and a ne  fee , and ibl  ni i e damage ). 
57. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10 05306 ODW, 2011 WL 597867, at *1 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 
2011) (finding allegations of possible future harm insufficient for standing). 
58. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 14 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding plaintiff s allegations 
of violation of statutory rights under the FCRA sufficed for standing). 
59. See, e.g., Daniel Townsend, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 76, 77 (2015) (stating that he S eme C  i  n  in he b ine  f im le e  
correction, and Spokeo would not have garnered so much attention including over thirty amicus 
briefs if it presented only a question that was easily resolved by preexisting standing doctrine ). 
60. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546 47 ( The Constitution confers limited authority on each branch of 
the Federal Government. . . . In order to remain faithful to this tripartite structure, the power of the 
Federal Judiciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers given to the other 
branches. . . . [Standing] doctrine developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not exceed 
hei  a h i  a  i  ha  been adi i nall  nde d. ). 
61. Id. at 1548 50 (elucidating a distinction between c nc e e  and a ic la i ed  for purposes 
of standing analysis). 
62. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ( Nobody doubts that 
identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized 
inj . ). 
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types of cases. For example, the Fourth Circuit denied standing in Beck v. 
McDonald,63 where two data breaches at a medical center resulted in the 
l  f he lain iff  e nal inf ma ion including names, social 
security numbers, birth dates, physical descriptors, and medical 
diagnoses.64 The Fourth Circuit pointed to the absence of allegations that 
he c m mi ed inf ma i n had been ed  lain iff  de imen  in he 
intervening years in denying standing. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
denied standing to all plaintiffs save one in In re SuperValu, Inc.,65 in 
which hackers breached the payment-card system of a grocery chain.66 
The only plaintiff who squeaked through the standing inquiry was the one 
who alleged a fraudulent charge appeared on his payment card.67 The 
court looked to the fact that no social security numbers, birth dates, or 
d i e  licen e n mbe  e e alleged  ha e been len, and f nd ha  
without that information it would be unlikely that the data thief could open 
ne  acc n  ing lain iff  iden i ie .68 
The Se en h Ci c i  deci i n in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group 
LLC69 stands as the polar opposite to Beck in the data-breach context. 
Where Beck found no standing even though bad actors purloined highly 
sensitive information including social security numbers, Remijas found 
standing even though plaintiffs alleged only the theft of credit card 
numbers, not social security numbers or birth dates. Beck relied on a 
constellation of highly specific and often dubious arguments against 
finding standing, such as distinguishing other cases on the grounds that 
he  in l ed allega i n  ha  the data thief intentionally targeted the 
personal information compromised in the data breaches. 70 Remijas offers 
a more straightforward approach that seems more apt for what is supposed 
to be a threshold, non-merits inquiry, finding it plausible to infer that 
hackers who obtained the private information of plaintiffs intended to use 
                                                     
63. 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
64. Id. at 267 (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue based on risk of harm following data breach 
that compromised personally identifying information and health information). 
65. 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).  
66. Id. (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue based on risk of harm following data breach that 
compromised payment card information). 
67. Id. at 772. 
68. Id. at 770. 
69. 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
70. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). Beck is not the first appellate decision 
to indulge in curious arguments about a data thief s motivations. In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the Third 
Circuit denied standing in part on the grounds that [h]ere, there is no evidence that the intrusion was 
intentional or malicious.  664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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that inf ma i n,  lain iff  de imen .71 
Indeed, Beck notwithstanding, courts have been more apt to find 
standing when more information is allegedly lost. For instance, in two 
recent cases,72 data breaches led to loss of information including names, 
birth dates, and social security numbers, among other types of 
information. Both courts found the threat of harm sufficient to confer 
standing.73 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit echoed Remijas, finding it 
plausible to infer a substantial risk of harm from hackers obtaining the 
personal information of plaintiffs and declining to penalize plaintiffs for 
filing suit before actually suffering identity theft.74 
Cases involving wrongful collection rather than data breach present 
di inc  i e . The S eme C  fail e to offer meaningful guidance 
in Spokeo is of particular importance in these cases. In one influential 
case, Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,75 the plaintiff learned that Time 
Warner Cable continued to keep private information about him, including 
his date of birth, social security number, address, phone numbers, and 
credit card information some eight years after he cancelled his cable 
subscription. The plaintiff alleged that this constituted a straightforward 
violation of the CCPA, which required Time Warner to destroy all that 
information once it no longer had a customer relationship with Gubala.76 
B  he Se en h Ci c i  f nd ha  Time Wa ne  na h i ed e en i n 
f lain iff  inf ma i n did n  ac all  ha m lain iff.77 
                                                     
71. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 ( A  hi  age in he li igation, it is plausible to infer that the 
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else would 
hacke  b eak in  a e  da aba e and eal c n me  i a e inf ma i n? P e mabl , he 
purpose of the hack i , ne   la e ,  make f a d len  cha ge   a me h e c n me  
iden i ie . ). 
72. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 23 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384, 386 87 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiffs had standing to sue based on 
risk of future harm following data breach that compromised personal information). 
73. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 622 23; Galaria, 663 F. App x at 386 87. 
74. Galaria, 663 F. App x at 388 ( The e i  n  need f  ec la i n he e Plain iff  allege ha  
their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals. . . . Where 
Plaintiffs already know that they have lost control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect 
Plaintiffs to wait for actual misuse a fraudulent charge on a credit card, for example before taking 
e   en e hei  n e nal and financial ec i . ). 
75. 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to sue based on defendant s 
unlawful retention of personal information beyond time mandated for destruction). 
76. Id. at 910. Specifically, the statute ide  ha  a cable e a  hall de  e nall  
identifiable information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was 
c llec ed and he e a e n  ending e e   de  f  acce   ch inf ma i n.  Id. 
77. Id. at 913. 
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c. The Temporal Strain 
Further complicating matters is the fact that many data-protection cases 
do not involve observed identity theft, and for good reason. As the 
Seventh Circuit noted in Remijas, the longer a plaintiff waits for identity 
theft to occur before bringing suit, the more likely a defendant is to be 
able to argue that an intervening data breach caused the harm.78 Plaintiffs 
stuck choosing between suing shortly after a data breach (alleging only an 
increased risk of identity theft) or years down the line when fraudulent 
charges have appeared (possibly as a result of any number of other 
intervening data breaches) have generally chosen the former course. In 
doing so, they often trade a merits problem for a threshold one. Judicial 
demands for allegations of actual identity theft force plaintiffs into a lose-
lose situation. 
B. Recurring Errors 
That the federal courts get standing in data-protection litigation wrong 
cannot, of course, be taken for granted. Scholars have raised many issues 
i h he c  ea ning in leading cases for example, shifting the 
locus of the standing inquiry, myopically viewing asserted harms, and 
miscalculating risk. Pulling together these strains of criticism, broader 
discussion of standing doctrine, and analysis of the case law, this Article 
shows that courts routinely err in these cases in two critical ways. First, 
courts wrongly focus on the nature of the harm rather than the party 
asserting the harm. Second, courts flub their assessment of the harm itself. 
1. Harm-Centered Standing 
The three-part anding e  e and effec  e e, f m i  
inception and for decades, focused on ensuring that the correct plaintiff 
brought a given claim.79 Cases since Clapper, however, have pivoted 
away from focusing on the party asserting a harm and toward an inquiry 
into the sufficiency of the harm itself, injecting further confusion in data-
                                                     
78. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) ( Re i ing he 
lain iff   ai  f  he h ea ened ha m  ma e iali e in de   e  ld c ea e a diffe en  
problem: he m e ime ha  a e  be een a da a b each and an in ance f iden i  hef , he m e 
la i de a defendan  ha   a g e ha  he iden i  hef  i  n  fai l  aceable   he defendan  da a 
b each.  (ci a i n  mi ed)). 
79. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 100 (1968) (h lding ha  hen anding i  laced in 
issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to 
e e  an adj dica i n f a a ic la  i e and n  he he  he i e i elf i  j iciable ); see also 
Wu, supra note 15, at 440 44 (collecting cases). 
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protection cases. As Felix Wu has convincingly demonstrated, data-
protection cases are driving this shift, with consequences that cascade 
outside the realm of data-protection litigation.80 
The S eme C  hi ic f c  n a  a he  han ha m i  e iden  
from the early modern standing cases. Flast v. Cohen,81 for example, 
recognized that [ ]he f ndamen al a ec  f anding i  ha  i  f c e  n 
the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the 
i e  he i he   ha e adj dica ed. 82 In his survey of major standing 
cases, Wu demonstrates that the focus on party prevailed at least until 
Clapper.83 But lower court cases following Clapper, and arguably the 
Supreme Court itself in Spokeo, focused the inquiry on whether privacy 
ha m  a e ha m  f  e  f anding. 
The Se en h Ci c i  anding di mi al in Gubala is the paradigmatic 
case. There, the court held that the aggrieved cable c me  c ld n  
more sue than someone who, though he has never subscribed and means 
never to subscribe to a cable company, nevertheless is outraged by the 
thought that Time Warner and perhaps other cable companies are 
violating a federal statute with apparent impunity. 84 In other words, the 
court held expressly that, for standing purposes, the identity of the 
plaintiff is irrelevant, or at most secondary to the question of whether there 
has been a proper harm. That holding could not be farther from the rule 
followed by the Supreme Court for decades that standing is about the 
parties, not the issues. It is also difficult to situate within either of the 
primary justifications for standing. The separation of powers is not 
enhanced by focusing on harm rather than party; if anything, the opposite 
is true the Gubala c  h he ical c nce ned ci i en, like he 
plaintiff in Fairchild, sets up the quintessential separation-of-powers 
standing dismissal. Likewise, the concerned citizen has little, if any, stake 
in the outcome of such a dispute compared to an affected former customer. 
Gubala, therefore, cannot be said to proceed from the adversarial 
justification either.85 
                                                     
80. Wu, supra note 15, at 446 57 (tracing development of standing jurisprudence). 
81. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
82. Id. at 99. 
83. See Wu, supra note 15, at 442 46 (discussing, inter alia, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, and Summers v. Earth Island Institute). 
84. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 911 12 (7th Cir. 2017). 
85. Highlighting how unmoored the Gubala decision is from earlier conceptions of standing, Wu 
notes that the Seventh Circuit effectively treated as insignificant the fact that the plaintiffs in the case 
were suing on the basis of their inf ma i n ha ing been e ained and n  me ne el e  
information precisely the sort of fact that was of crucial significance in cases like Lujan.  W , supra 
note 15, at 456 (emphasis in original).  
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A harm-focused approach also contributes to the fragmentation of 
standing, to use the term coined by Richard Fallon.86 Fallon describes a 
endenc  in he S eme C  anding deci i n  a d c m le , 
confusing, and irreconcilable distinctions between various types of cases, 
all purportedly decided pursuant to the same three-part test for standing. 
His examples primarily involve public rights and actors: challenges to 
government conduct, such as cases arising under the Establishment 
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, national security, challenges to agency 
procedures, cases brought by governmental actors and entities, and 
probability-based challenges to government conduct.87 The harm-focused 
approach emerging in data-protection litigation gives rise to similar 
fragmentation in disputes between private parties asserting private rights, 
such as the typical data-breach case of a privacy claim against a 
private enterprise. 
As Fallon recognizes, a complex doctrine of standing is not necessarily 
a bad thing.88 As discussed above, the best justification for standing 
doctrine varies from case to case; intuitively, the question of whether a 
given plaintiff may sue to stop large-scale government surveillance raises 
entirely different issues than whether a plaintiff may sue to make a cable 
company delete retained customer information. But hiding such 
complexity behind a one-size-fits-all test and repeated invocations of 
vague, high-minded concepts like the separation of powers serves no 
one.89 Confusion is the inevitable result of this approach, as is ici n 
of naked, result- ien ed mani la i n. 90 
Worse still, as Wu argues, shifting focus to the sufficiency of an alleged 
harm usurps the role of the legislative branch,91 directly contrary to the 
justification for standing doctrine invoked in most recent Supreme Court 
standing jurisprudence.92 Particularly where, as in Gubala, a plaintiff sues 
                                                     
86. See Fallon, supra note 13, a  1070 ( B  f agmen a i n,  I mean he di i i n f anding la  
into multiple compartments, most of which may be intelligible in themselves, but that reflect more 
c nce al and n ma i e di e i  han ni . ). 
87. See id. at 1070 92 (collecting examples of divergent approaches to the standing inquiry). 
88. See id. at 1092 ( In inci le, d c inal c m le i  . . . could promote valid purposes, even if it 
made knowledge of the law harder to attain. Nearly all rules are over or underinclusive when measured 
against their background justifications. Without wholly eliminating over and underinclusivity, a more 
complex system of rules might, under some circumstances, produce better outcomes than a simpler, 
more elegant doc inal c e. ). 
89. See, e.g., id. a  1116 ( In he d main f anding la , e h ld ec gni e im lici  and 
elegance a  ill i n . ). 
90. Id. at 1094. 
91. See Wu, supra note 15, at 451 (arguing that dismissal of federal statutory claims on standing 
g nd  hif  he l c  f c n l e  he de el men  f he la ). 
92. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) ( [By] limit[ing] 
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under a federal statute, a rule rejecting standing for violation of the statute 
prevents both enforcement of the statute and development of precedential 
interpretation of that statute. For Wu, this represents constitutionalizing a 
deregulatory agenda.93 
While there is reason to believe that the current state of affairs is not so 
dire,94 the implications of this change in focus are tremendous. 
Developing a robust body of law inviting judges to find a plaintiff has no 
standing based on a threshold, supposedly non-merits assessment of her 
injury necessarily invites judges to indulge their own beliefs and biases. 
For instance, in the context of constitutional litigation, it is already 
apparent that Supreme Court case law develops largely from the views of 
the justices on the rights in question.95 It would be in the public interest to 
make that kind of outcome more difficult to reach; a focus on asserted 
harms makes it far easier. Such activity is also observable in data-
protection litigation, where judicial skepticism has the potential to wreak 
havoc on privacy law.96 
2. The Sufficiency of Harm 
Shifting to a harm-based standing inquiry might raise less concern if 
the courts could be counted on to assess harms consistently and 
accurately. At least in the data-protection context, they have not done so. 
Scores of cases dismissing data-protection lawsuits for perceived lack of 
harm misunderstand the risks in question, fail to treat probabilistic injuries 
seriously, and ignore the non-monetary harms that flow from data-
                                                     
the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal 
wrong . . . [ ]he la  f A icle III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used 
to usurp the powers of the political b anche  and c nfine  he fede al c   a e l  j dicial 
role.  (ci a i n  mi ed)). 
93. See id. at 460 ( S anding bec me  a mean  b  hich li icall  de i able eg la i n i  ck 
down by the courts. Whatever the merits of a deregulatory agenda, that agenda should be established, 
if a  all, h gh he li ical ce . ). 
94. See infra section II.A.3 (showing that federal statutory claims fare reasonably well against 
standing challenges in data-protection litigation). 
95. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1095 96 ( [T]he J ice  b an i e c n i i nal ie  
ine i abl  d i e anding deci i n  in a n mbe  f im an  a ea . ); see also Nichol, supra note 13, 
a  304 ( A  eli e j dge  mma il  de e mine hich in e e  a e h  f legal c gni ance, he  
n i ingl  emb ace c nce n  ha  ike cl e   h me, aining ha m  ha  mi  he 
e e ience  and edilec i n  f hei  n li e . ). 
96. See Wu, supra note 15, at 450. Wu argues that by throwing out cases for lack of standing where 
c  ha e d b  ab  he e i ence f a c gni able ha m, c  a e n  nl  ad ing a a ic la  
perspective on the nature and value of privacy, they are shifting the law on standing to one that allows 
courts to dismiss claims on the basis of their views on the nature and value of the asserted harms. That 
shift will have effects far beyond the privacy cases that precipitated it.  Id. 
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protection violations. In doing so, they eschew reasoning that has rendered 
the standing inquiry an afterthought in numerous other contexts. 
a. Underestimating the Risk of Identity Theft 
Two considerations have taken on an almost talismanic nature for 
federal courts assessing the risk of identity theft following a data breach: 
what specific information is at issue, and whether plaintiffs have already 
seen signs of identity theft. As to the latter, courts generally find that 
allegations of actual identity theft suffice for standing.97 But where a 
lain iff  iden i  ha  n  e  been len, he ecific inf ma i n 
involved often decides the case. 
Many courts have demanded that substantial amounts of personally 
identifiable information (PII) be taken to present a substantial risk of 
harm. Take SuperValu, for example. SuperValu, which operated chains of 
grocery and liquor stores, suffered a data breach affecting its cash register 
system at over 200 stores.98 The company allegedly employed poor 
security practices, including the use of default passwords, despite the 
valuable and sensitive information stored on its servers.99 The hack 
compromised customer information including names, credit card 
numbers, three-digit verification codes, and PINs. But the Eighth Circuit 
found that plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury-in-fact, citing the 
lack of personally identifiable information in the compromised data.100 In 
he c  ie , he inf ma i n aken ld n  enable the hackers to 
en ne  acc n  in lain iff  name , and he ef e lain iff  failed  
plead a substantial risk of harm.101 
Focusing on PII does have intuitive appeal. An allegation that a 
                                                     
97. See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017) ( [P]lain iff H lme  allege  
a present injury in fact to support his standing. He alleges that he suffered a fraudulent charge on the 
credit card he previously used to make a purchase at one f defendan  e  affec ed b  he da a 
b eache . ). 
98. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Supervalu Discloses a Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/technology/food-retailer-discloses-a-data-breach.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ZVW-L8QL] (reporting that breach affected 180 SuperValu stores and 29 
franchised stores). 
99. See SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 766. 
100. See id. a  770 ( Ini iall , e n e ha  he allegedl  len Ca d Inf ma i n d e  n  incl de 
an  e nall  iden if ing inf ma i n, ch a  cial ec i  n mbe , bi h da e ,  d i e  licen e 
n mbe . ).  
101. Id. ( [P] an   he fac al e idence elied n in he c m lain , he e i  li le  n  i k ha  
anyone will use the Card Information stolen in these data breaches to open unauthorized accounts in 
he lain iff  name , hich i  he e f iden i  hef  gene all  c n ide ed  ha e a m e ha mf l 
di ec  effec  n c n me .  (ci a i n  mi ed)). 
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defendant has allowed bad actors to obtain PII suggests that the plaintiff 
is at high risk of identity theft the bad actor has all the information they 
need  b ain c edi  in he lain iff  name  he i e im e na e he 
plaintiff. 
But it is not true, as cases like SuperValu hold, that loss of less or 
different information means a plaintiff is not at risk. Information does not 
exist in a vacuum. Researchers have for decades demonstrated that 
supposedly non-identifying information can be aggregated, analyzed, and 
reidentified. Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove, for instance, discuss the 
e am le f AOL  2006 elea e f en  milli n ea ch e ie  ha  
AOL had fully anonymized users were described only by a number.102 
Researchers nevertheless were able to identify the person behind the 
number in many cases simply by collating searches.103 Paul Ohm provides 
an he  b acing e am le: How many other people in the United States 
share your specific combination of ZIP code, birth date (including year), 
and sex? According to a landmark study, for 87 percent of the American 
population, the answer is zero; these three pieces of information uniquely 
iden if  each f hem. 104 One recent study found that reidentification 
becomes possible given only a few attributes, and that access to fifteen 
demographic attributes would uniquely identify 99.98% of individuals.105 
To focus on the completeness of PII lost in a data breach is therefore 
too narrow, and, indeed, it is emblematic of what Schwartz and Solove 
ha e called he PII blem, 106 as it overemphasizes particular types and 
groupings of information. Again, SuperValu proves instructive. Even 
c n ide ing he l  inf ma i n in i la i n, he c  finding eem  
intuitively odd. But it is even harder to reconcile when combined with the 
fact that modern data thieves often have access to other troves of 
information including names, social security numbers, and dates of birth. 
                                                     
102. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841 (2011) (discussing examples of 
users identified from f ll  an n mi ed  ea ch queries). 
103. Id. 
104. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (a g ing ha  eiden ifica i n nd[ ] he 
dea h knell f  he idea ha  e ec  i ac  hen e em e PII f m  da aba e ). 
105. Luc Rocher, Julien M. Hendrickx & Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Estimating the Success of 
Re-identifications in Incomplete Datasets Using Generative Models, NATURE COMMC NS, July 23, 
2019, a  5 (n ing ha  [ ]  e l , fi , h  ha  fe  a ib e  a e f en fficien   e-identify 
with high confidence individuals in heavily incomplete datasets and, second, reject the claim that 
sampling or releasing partial datasets, e.g., from one hospital network or a single online service, 
ide la ible deniabili ). 
106. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 102 (arguing for a new theoretical approach to PII accounting 
for the malleability of information). 
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Aggregation of that data with the information lost in the SuperValu breach 
gives the thieves everything they need to perpetrate identity theft on a 
massive scale. The risk to the plaintiffs in any given data breach is thus 
much higher than is stated by those courts that narrowly focus their 
inquiry into harm. 
b. Economic Harm and Probabilistic Injuries 
Speculative and inaccurate judicial estimation of the risk of harm is 
particularly galling because there is no textual or logical basis for such a 
practice.107 The S eme C  anding j i dence clea l  
establishes that the bar for monetary loss to constitute injury-in-fact is 
incredibly low, if it exists at all.108 Yet courts still demand increasingly 
higher risk of harm in order to find standing based on a possible future 
injury. 
It is therefore troubling that the federal courts do not meaningfully 
engage the concept of expected value in assessing the existence of an 
Article III harm in data-protection litigation. Expected value is an 
economic concept used widely in law, economics, psychology and other 
fields to neatly estimate the value of a future harm by multiplying the size 
of the harm by the probability that it will occur.109 Others have discussed 
how expected value might be used in lawsuits to assess harm. Jonathan 
Nash notes, for example, that mortality risks of 1 in 100,000 would suffice 
for a showing of injury in fact.110 While the consequences that flow from 
a privacy harm may not typically include death, and the probability that 
they will occur is not susceptible to easy calculation, even a rudimentary 
calculation of expected value would seem to establish the existence of a 
harm in a typical data-protection case.111 For example, a 2014 study by 
                                                     
107. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 65 (noting that Article III does not distinguish between low 
i k  f ha m and high i k  f ha m ); see also id. a  67 (a g ing ha  [ ]ha  hi  mean  i  ha  all 
claims based on risk of injury present an actual case or controversy, no matter how small the risk. So 
l ng a  (1) he challenged ac i i  inc ea e  he lain iff  i k f ffe ing ha m and (2) a j dicial 
order could stop the challenged activity, thereby removing the increased risk of harm, courts should 
have Article III j i dic i n  hea  he claim ). 
108. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (noting 
ha  [f]  anding e , a l  f e en a mall am n  f m ne  i  dina il  an inj ); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 31 (1961) (finding plaintiffs who were fined five dollars 
each had standing); see also Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(h lding ha  [a] d lla  f ec n mic ha m i  ill an inj -in-fac  f  anding e ). 
109. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 15, at 1306 (proposing an expected-value test for standing where 
an  i i e e ec ed al e ld ffice and defining an e ec ed al e e  a  multiplying the 
magni de f he ha m b  i  babili ). 
110. Id. 
111. Although those courts that have engaged in something approximating such an inquiry have 
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the Department of Justice found that the average loss for a victim of 
identity theft amounted to $1,343.112 Even a 1/1000 risk of identity theft 
in the wake of a data breach would establish an expected loss of more than 
one dollar, the actual loss of which courts in other contexts have held 
sufficient for standing purposes.113 
Furthermore, as Nash argues, the risk of harm creates present economic 
effects;114 that is, risks of harm inflict present injuries separate from the 
expected value of that future harm. The paradigmatic example is the 
existence of insurance individuals and businesses alike pay relatively 
small amounts in the present to cover themselves from incurring larger 
costs in the event of future harm.115 In the data-protection context, news 
of a data breach might lead an affected customer to purchase credit 
monitoring, or to undertake the time-consuming and costly process of 
changing any affected information such as her social security number or 
credit card information.116 These are real, present economic harms that 
result from data breaches. That a single dollar of economic harm suffices 
for injury-in-fact in other contexts reveals troubling exceptionalism in 
data-protection litigation. 
c. Non-Economic Harm 
In any event, injury-in-fact is not limited to economic harm. The 
Supreme Court has long held that non-economic interests may support 
standing, specifically identifying aesthetic, conservational, recreational, 
and spiritual interests as potentially supporting standing.117 Data-
                                                     
not done the inquiry credit. See, for example, the Beck Court s determination that a 33% chance that 
affected plaintiffs would suffer identity theft meant that it was more likely than not that a given 
plaintiff would not be harmed, thus precluding standing. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275
76 (4th Cir. 2017). 
112. See Cody Gredler, The Real Cost of Identity Theft, CSID (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.csid.com/2016/09/real-cost-identity-theft/ [https://perma.cc/C5DM-G8FE]. 
113. See Carpenters Indus. Council, 854 F.3d at 5. 
114. Nash, supra note 15, at 1325. 
115. Id. at 1326 ( Indeed, indi id al  f en ac   b i e c en  ec n mic c  f  f e risk. 
Consider the institution of insurance: people who insure against risks pay current dollars as the 
insurance premium. In return, they will be reimbursed for (at least most of) the costs of the future 
ha m in ed again . ). 
116. Federal courts have explicitly refused to take such costs into account in determining whether 
lain iff  ha e ffe ed ha m, deeming he e inj ie  elf-im ed.  Beck, 848 F.3d at 276 77 
(collecting cases). 
117. See A n f Da a P ce ing Se . O g ., Inc. . Cam , 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); see also 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 63 (1992) ( Of c e, he de i e  e  b e e an 
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of 
anding. ). 
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protection litigation implicates a variety of non-economic harms that 
courts have been hesitant to embrace. 
The obvious non-economic harms flowing from a data breach are 
increased risk of identity theft and anxiety about the fallout of the data 
breach. Citron and Solove persuasively argue that these are real harms that 
ought to suffice for standing purposes,118 as they have sufficed in other 
contexts. Increased risk of future harm, for example, has been found 
compensable in the medical malpractice and environmental law 
contexts.119 That these types of harms suffice in those contexts is 
unsurprising given the strongest underlying purpose of standing doctrine 
in private-rights cases: ensuring that the litigants have sufficient interest 
and adversity to frame the issues in dispute. So, too, in the data-protection 
context. A plaintiff whose information has been stolen incurs increased 
risk of identity theft and possibly present costs to ameliorate the risk. Such 
a plaintiff has a clear interest in obtaining redress. The defendant has a 
concomitant interest in avoiding liability. 
The larger harm, however, is anxiety. It is hard to envision a credit-
monitoring solution so robust that a person whose information has been 
stolen need never think about identity theft again, to say nothing of data 
breaches that involve the loss of intimate or embarrassing information.120 
Surveys of data-breach victims confirm this intuition. For example, one 
survey of victims of the 2017 Equifax data breach found that nearly 90% 
f e nden  e e ienced ad e e feeling   em i n ,  and 81% f 
that group reported feeling anxiety as a result of the breach.121 
It should be beyond dispute that this anxiety is a cognizable harm. 
Courts rejecting it in data-protection cases run counter to recognition of 
anxiety as sufficient harm in other cases. Ryan Calo notes the 
in e en ial e am le f he  f a a l where the harm is the 
emotion of fear . . . . 122 Citron and Solove catalog other torts premised 
on pure emotional distress, including alienation of affection, breach of 
confidentiality, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
                                                     
118. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 744 45 ( Ri k and an ie  a e inj ie  in he he e 
and n . ). 
119. Id. at 761 62 (discussing contexts in which courts have found future harm compensable). 
120. See id. at 764 65 (discussing fallout from data breach at a website used to arrange adulterous 
relationships, including the suicides of multiple individuals affected). 
121. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., EQUIFAX ONE YEAR LATER: AFTERMATH REPORT 2018, at 1, 4 
(2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ITRC_Equifax-Breach-
Aftermath-Report-2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9HQ-2SNS] (reporting that victims of identity theft 
experience emotions ch a  fea  ega ding hei  e nal financial ec i   feeling a sense of 
hel le ne ).  
122. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 363 (2014). 
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and the privacy torts themselves.123 It is no longer controversial that these 
torts are redressable in court. Yet courts do not take analogous injuries in 
data-protection cases seriously, often preferring instead to concoct 
distinctions with no basis in logic or precedent.124 
To the extent courts have dismissed anxiety stemming from privacy 
harms as too difficult to calculate, they again depart from settled rules in 
other contexts. Julie Cohen notes the backflips that courts are willing to 
perform in order to quantify damages in intellectual-property lawsuits.125 
And in any event, whether the harm is difficult to calculate goes to the 
issue of remedies, not standing. 
Standing is vital in ensuring the constitutional role and proper 
functioning of the federal judiciary. Tying together various strains of 
scholarship helps to identify examples of federal courts drifting from the 
history and purpose of the doctrine in data-protection litigation. However, 
the focus on a relative handful of Supreme Court and appellate cases 
leaves unclear the extent of the potential problem. That narrow focus also 
makes it more difficult to identify potential causes and solutions. Part II 
takes the next step by surveying a broader landscape of standing 
challenges in data-protection cases in an effort to understand how 
widespread the problem has become and determine why the courts 
have drifted. 
II. EXPLORING ERROR 
Existing literature makes several important contributions in identifying 
errors and discrepancies in leading data-protection cases. But these 
piecemeal analyses cannot reveal whether there are systemic pressures 
behind the errors, and therefore are limited in what solutions they 
can propose. 
This Part shows that systemic problems drive erroneous decisions on 
standing in data-protection litigation. Through analysis of hand-collected 
and hand-coded data derived from 217 decisions in these types of cases, 
this Part identifies a variety of factors leading to the aberrant decisions on 
standing in data-protection litigation discussed in Part I. While some of 
                                                     
123. Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 768 73 (discussing development of legal redress for 
anxiety). 
124. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing medical 
mal ac ice and ic  ca e  f m da a b each beca e he e i  n  an ifiable i k f damage in 
he f e  and h e ca e  hinge[] n h man heal h c nce n ). 
125. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 542 (noting, inter alia, that in copyright and patent infringement 
cases, courts a ign damages based on hypothesized reasonable licensing fees for imagined 
an ac i n ; i  men  f licen ing a e  f  na cen   n ne i en  ma ke ; and de e mine he 
profits attributable to infringing activity by means of arithmetically convenient fic i n ). 
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these explanations such as path dependence are relatively innocuous, 
others lend support to the view that federal courts are engaged in 
inappropriate policy- and preference-based decision-making. 
Section II.A describes the methodology employed to assemble and 
code the data set underlying this Part. Section II.B presents empirical 
findings from the 217 cases included in the data set and the most direct 
explanations for erroneous decisions that arise from the data, including 
overreliance on Clapper and failure to proceed from the appropriate 
justification for standing. Section II.C discusses other potential 
explanations that find support in the case law and in existing scholarship 
across a number of fields, most worrying among them evidence of 
preference-based decisions. 
A. Methodology 
1. Selection of Cases 
To assemble the data set analyzed in this Article, I conducted multiple 
searches of the Westlaw database of all federal cases decided between 
February 26, 2013, (the date on which the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Clapper) and the end of 2019. Cases were identified via two 
search strings, designed to be fairly overinclusive: 1) op((data /p privacy) 
& standing); and 2) op((data /p breach) & standing).126 In total, these 
searches returned 2,056 results.127 I then manually reviewed each case to 
determine if the decision dealt with a challenge to standing to assert a 
data-protection claim that is, a claim involving alleged wrongful 
collection or disclosure of private information.128 Of the 2,056 cases 
reviewed, 217 fit those criteria.129 I conducted substantially all of the 
analysis on a subset of 209 cases after discarding eight cases in which 
courts reached mixed results on standing. 
                                                     
126. Thus, search one would return all federal cases that included the words data  and privacy  
in the same paragraph, and that also included the word standing  anywhere in the opinion. The op  
operator restricts the search to the text of the opinion itself, thus excluding Westlaw s proprietary 
editorial Headnotes.  
127. The total number of results is reached by conducting one omnibus search that captures the 
results from both searches. 
128. While I construed data-protection claims broadly, I excluded certain types of claims that fell 
just beyond the scope of wrongful collection or disclosure of private information, although nominally 
asserting privacy claims. The most frequent type of claim excluded at this edge was for unsolicited 
telephone calls to plaintiffs in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See Hale v. 
Creditors Relief LLC, No. 17-2447, 2018 WL 2539080 (D.N.J. June 4, 2018). 
129. The most frequent types of false positives in the search results include motions to suppress 
evidence in criminal proceedings and decisions in all types of cases using the rhetorical phrase 
standing alone.  See Doe v. Compact Info. Sys., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-5013-M, 2015 WL 11022761, at 
*5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015). 
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2. Case Coding 
I reviewed all cases fitting the selection criteria and hand-coded each 





Whether the case involved a data breach; 
Formulation of standing doctrine; 
Standing outcome; 
Merits outcome, if present; 
Citation to Clapper; and 
Citation to Spokeo.130 
Across all 217 cases, I identified eighty-three distinct types of claims 
asserted f  e am le, negligence, i la i n f Ne  Y k  Gene al 
Business Law, violation of the federal Stored Communications Act, and 
violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution. I then 
assigned each type of claim to one of fourteen second-level categories
for example, negligence is a non-privacy tort and violation of the Stored 
Communications Act is a federal wiretap claim. Finally, I assigned each 
type of claim to one of five high-level categories based on its second-level 
category for example, grouping together all common-law claims and all 
federal statutory claims. 
3. Description of the Data Set 
The data set includes decisions from fifty-eight different federal courts, 
authored by 148 different judges.131 In total, district court opinions 
account for 177 decisions in the data set, with the remaining thirty-two 
coming from the courts of appeals. The number of cases decided in each 
year analyzed varies significantly: 
  
                                                     
130. As a check on coding accuracy, a research assistant independently coded a subset of sixty-
three cases on these same issues. I measured coding reliability using Cohen s kappa, finding a high 
deg ee f imila i  in c ding ac  he ke  mea e  f anding c me (  = 0.936), ci a i n  
Clapper (  = 0.935), and e ence f a da a b each (  = 1), a  ell a  n he e alen  f m la i n  
of standing doctrine, case or controversy  (  = 0.904) and ab ence f a ed f m la i n (  = 0.967). 
131. This figure excludes the five per curiam appellate decisions included in the dataset. 
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Table 1: 
Breakdown of Cases by Year 
 









4. Limitations of the Data Set 
While the data set is reasonably comprehensive, it is not without 
limitations. As a starting point, it is limited to decisions present in the 
Westlaw database, which may not include every decision from every 
federal court. Analysis of the decisions of appellate courts may be skewed 
by exogenous selection effects, namely, that a district c  denial f a 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing is not immediately appealable. 
Similarly, analysis of particular district courts may be skewed by 
lain iff  f m-shopping behavior certain early circuit court opinions 
may have incentivized plaintiffs to bring claims in district courts governed 
by relatively friendly circuit decisions. 
B. Findings 
At least in the context of data-protection litigation, the federal courts 
appear to have lost sight of the purpose of standing doctrine. That 
conclusion is supported by multiple findings that emerge from the data. 
Most significant among those findings is that the courts rely too heavily 
on Clapper and tend to find no standing when relying on Clapper. Other 
end  a a en  in he da a incl de he c  marked tendency not to 
expressly discuss the purpose of the standing inquiry, disparate results 
depending on the type of claim asserted, and substantial jurisdictional 
variations in the adjudication of standing challenges. 
1. Citation to Clapper Correlates with Denial of Standing 
Clapper has little to do with data protection by private entities NSA 
communications interception at a massive scale in the name of national 
security implicates a host of concerns that do not arise when private 
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entities obtain or lose control of private information. That has not stopped 
it from becoming the go-to Supreme Court precedent for lower courts 
grappling with challenges to standing in data-protection litigation. Indeed, 
nearly all the major appellate cases discussed in this Article engage 
extensively with Clapper.132 In doing so, the courts of appeals ingrained 
the idea that Clapper  ha h a e men  f f e ha m  in he anding 
inquiry should be applied wholesale in data-protection litigation. District 
courts followed suit, regularly relying on Clapper in discussing data-
protection standing, and particularly when denying standing. 
The data on this point bear emphasis. Of 209 standing decisions in data-
protection litigation issued after Clapper, 103 (49.3%) cite Clapper. Of 
those 103 cases, sixty-six (64%) find the plaintiffs lack standing. In 2016, 
the peak year for Clapper citations, sixteen out of twenty-four (67%) 
decisions citing Clapper denied standing.133 Regression analysis confirms 
the presence of a negative correlation between citation to Clapper and 
findings on standing.134 The effect is much more pronounced in the district 
courts, with 69% of district court decisions citing Clapper finding 
plaintiffs lack standing, compared to only 37.5% of appellate decisions 
citing Clapper.135 
  
                                                     
132. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 
(4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); In re 
SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 
(7th Cir. 2015). Only Gubala and Reilly do not discuss Clapper, and the latter by virtue of the fact 
that it predates Clapper. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017); Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
133. 2015 proved to be the most challenging year for plaintiffs confronted with Clapper-citing 
courts: 82% of the seventeen decisions that year denied standing. By way of comparison, 86% of 
decisions not citing Clapper that year found standing. 
134. When evaluated as the sole predictor of standing, citation to Clapper is significantly 
negatively correlated with standing (p < .001). When evaluated alongside a large group of other 
predictors (whether a case involves a data breach, standing formulation, and intermediate-category 
claim type), the negative correlation remains significant (p < .001). 
135. Although appellate courts, like district courts, found standing less frequently when citing 
Clapper, the relationship is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 1: 




















Many courts explicitly, but wrongly, contend that Clapper must be 
applied in data-protection cases. The Fourth Circuit in Beck, for example, 
declared that Clapper  di c i n f hen a h ea ened inj  
constitutes an Article III injury-in-fac  i  c n lling he e 136 but that is 
not correct. To the contrary, there is every reason to treat Clapper as at 
most persuasive in a data-protection case between private parties, given 
its unique context of a constitutional challenge to a statutory scheme 
enacted in the name of national security.137 Courts have substantial leeway 
in determining what, exactly, constitutes binding precedent in a given 
case.138 Recalling the purposes of standing doctrine illuminates the 
                                                     
136. Beck, 848 F.3d at 272. 
137. In one thorough examination of Clapper  ele ance, J dge K h ejec ed he n i n ha  
Clapper e e en  he ea change ha  [defendan ] gge .  In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Priv. Litig., 66 
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Judge Koh reached that conclusion by observing that 
Clapper did not change the law governing Article III standing. The Supreme Court did not overrule 
any precedent, nor did it reformulate the familiar standing requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, 
and redressability. . . . Moreover, Clapper  di c i n f anding a e in he en i i e c n e  f a 
claim that other branches of government were violating the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
itself noted tha  i  anding anal i  a  n all  ig  a  a e l .  Id. at 1213 14 (citing 
Cla e  . Amne  In l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)). 
138. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
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blem. The S eme C  ea ning in Clapper proceeds from the 
separation-of-powers rationale for standing. That rationale has no 
application in data-protection cases like Beck. Only by ignoring that 
discrepancy or its import can a court proclaim that Clapper 
directly controls. 
The data also show the existence of another path. The overall citation 
rate for Clapper, while high (49%), does not suggest that the courts 
uniformly believe it necessary to apply in data-protection cases. And just 
as citations to Clapper correlate with findings of no standing, of the 106 
cases studied that do not cite Clapper, 72.6% find standing exists.139 
Simply put, nothing about Clapper requires federal courts to dismiss data-
protection cases for lack of standing, but too often the courts have chosen 
the wrong path.140 
Figure 2: 




                                                     
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123 24 (2001) ( Wha  c n i e  eceden  
in a particular case is a flexible concept that is subject to interpretation, especially when considering 
cases that are not directly on point. In practice, courts may interpret a prior decision in such a way 
that it does not appear to be controlling, even though a strong argument might be made that it is 
relevant and controlling precedent. Courts may also do the opposite, citing a preceding case as 
controlling or persuasive precedent when that case is arguably not relevant to the issue at hand. 
Furthermore, courts may intentionally emphasize some facts and deemphasize others to make a case 
appear controlling or not, depending on the de i ed e l .  (footnotes omitted)). 
139. Here again, the appellate courts were more solicitous, finding standing in 87.5% of cases not 
citing Clapper, compared to only 70% of district court cases. 
140. That said, the data give some reason to hope for improvement: citations to Clapper in data-
protection cases have declined since 2016. 
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2. Failure to Consider the Purpose of Standing Doctrine 
Another factor potentially leading to standing dismissals in data-
protection litigation is the failure of courts to grapple with the appropriate 
justification for standing doctrine as they conduct the inquiry. In his 
concurrence in Spokeo, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the standing 
inquiry should be different depending on whether public or private rights 
are at issue in the case.141 In particular, he recognized that the separation 
of powers is not implicated when plaintiffs allege a violation of private 
rights, and that in private-rights cases a lain iff need n  allege ac al 
ha m be nd he in a i n f ha  i a e igh . 142 Data-protection 
lawsuits are private-rights actions and should typically survive 
standing challenges. 
Nonetheless, the data suggest that federal courts are not employing this 
approach, which helps account for why only 55% of the cases studied 
survived challenges to standing. Analysis of how federal courts justify 
application of standing doctrine in these cases yields troubling results. By 
far the most common justification relied on by the courts in these 
decisions is mere invocation of Article III  efe ence  Ca e   
C n e ie . 143 That clause of Article III is the textual hook for 
anding d c ine  e i ence but provides no guidance about the purpose 
f he d c ine. Ye  118 f he 209 (56%) ca e  died in ked Ca e  
 C n e ie  a  j ifica i n f  anding d c ine  e i ence, 
i h  an  f he  anal i   di c i n f anding  e. Worse, 
the second-most common justification found in the cases was the absence 
of justification: in eighty-five cases (41%), the court merely stated and 
applied the three-part test for standing. 
Courts are not, of course, required to recite the justification for every 
doctrine they apply. That said, it is striking that in 187 out of 209 (89%) 
cases studied, courts effectively declined to expressly engage with the 
justifications for a case-ending, constitutional doctrine as they applied 
it.144 Equally striking, the justification with the most relevance to data-
protection litigation the necessity of adversarial presentation of the 
                                                     
141. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 54 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(analyzing the public/private rights distinction in standing doctrine). 
142. Id. at 1553. 
143. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Priv. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ( An 
Article III federal court must ask whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury  a i f  he ca e 
 c n e  e i emen  f A icle III f he U.S. C n i i n. ). 
144. Sixteen of the 118 cases citing Cases  or Controversies  as a justification for standing 
doctrine also discuss another justification and are thus excluded from this statement. 
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issues appears in only four cases (1.9%).145 
3. Inconsistent Treatment of Different Types of Claims 
The data also reveal discrepancies in standing outcome depending on 
the types of claim asserted. Standing is, supposedly, a non-merits inquiry. 
The ecific f m la i n f a lain iff  claim i  n  a fac  in he h ee-
part test. Indeed, courts have developed a distinct doctrine of statutory 
standing that addresses whether a plaintiff with Article III standing 
nevertheless falls outside the zone of interest a statute is meant 
to address.146 
Yet the data show a substantial difference in standing determinations 
based on the type of claim being asserted and the source of the injury in 
question. Claims involving data breaches offer a striking example. Of the 
209 cases with definitive rulings on standing analyzed, ninety-four arose 
from a data breach. Courts found that these data breach plaintiffs had 
standing in only 47% of cases, compared to an overall standing rate of 
61% in non-data-breach cases. This discrepancy is, unsurprisingly, 
magnified by the Clapper effect. Of the eighty data-breach decisions, 
seventy-two cite Clapper, and only 37.5% of those cases find standing. 
  
                                                     
145. Although such a small sample size is not statistically significant, it is interesting to note that 
courts found standing existed in three (75%) of these cases. All four of these decisions came from 
district courts. See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding 
standing); Ruk v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 16-CV-3444-LMM, 2017 WL 3085282, at *1 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 22, 2017) (finding standing); Oneal v. First Tenn. Bank, No. 17-CV-3-SKL, 2018 WL 
1352519, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2018) (dismissing for lack of standing); Gordon v. Chipotle 
Mexican Grill, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1239 (D. Colo. 2018) (finding standing). 
146. See, e.g., Lexmark Int l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 
(2014) (noting that the inquiry whether a lain iff fall  i hin he cla  f lain iff  h m C ng e  
ha  a h i ed  e  i  me ime  called a  anding  and i  ea ed . . . as effectively 
j i dic i nal ). 
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Figure 3: 





















Similar discrepancies emerge when looking at the types of claims 
asserted. At a high level of generality, three categories of claims are most 
common in data-protection cases: state statutory (136 cases), common law 
(126 cases), and federal statutory (94 cases).147 Even at this level of 
generality, there are stark differences. State statutory claims fared the 
worst courts found standing in only 54% of cases asserting causes of 
action based on state statutes. The common law fared slightly better, with 
courts finding standing in 56% of cases asserting a common-law cause of 
action. Plaintiffs asserting claims based on federal statutes fared best, with 
courts finding standing in 63% of cases.148 
These high-level discrepancies can be explained to some extent by 
more granular examination of the claims asserted. For example, plaintiffs 
                                                     
147. Remaining high-level categories of claims were rarely asserted: state constitutional (eleven 
cases) and federal constitutional (five cases). In three cases, the nature of plaintiffs  claims was not 
apparent from the opinion. 
148. Regression analysis confirms a positive correlation between presence of a federal statutory 
claim and a finding of standing (p < .05). No statistically significant correlation was found with 
respect to state statutory or common law claims. 
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asserting federal wiretap claims were very successful: courts found 
standing in 87% of cases asserting violations of the Wiretap Act or the 
Stored Communications Act.149 But only two cases in the entire data set 
involved assertion of a state-law wiretap claim.150 
Figure 4: 




















Plaintiffs suing under privacy statutes did not fare as well, further 
supporting the notion that judges are skeptical about privacy harms. Only 
62% of cases involving claims under state privacy statutes were permitted 
to proceed, well ahead of the 52% of federal privacy claims in which 
courts found standing. 
Of note, the most prevalent category of statutory claims was also the 
least successful: consumer protection. Just 50% of the ninety-six decisions 
involving state-law consumer protection claims found standing; for 
federal consumer protection claims, that number creeps up only to 54% in 
                                                     
149. Here, too, regression analysis confirms a positive correlation between presence of a federal 
wiretap claim and a finding of standing (p < .05).  
150. See In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2013); 
Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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fifty cases.151 
More detailed examination reveals interesting variation. The most 
common type of consumer protection claim i la i n f Calif nia  
Unfair Competition Law (UCL), an act with strict statutory standing 
requirements fared relatively well: courts found standing existed in 60% 
of the forty-three cases asserting UCL claims.152 The most common 
federal consumer protection claim violation of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act was less successful, with courts finding standing in 55% of thirty-
three cases. The biggest loser among federal consumer protection claims 
were claims under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
(FACTA) only 38% of the thirteen cases asserting such claims survived 
a standing challenge. 
Figure 5: 






















                                                     
151. A negative correlation between presence of a state consumer-protection claim and finding of 
standing exists in the data (p < .05). 
152. This level of success may be attributable at least in part due to the courts hearing the claims: 
thirty-five of the forty-three cases asserting UCL claims were heard in California s district courts, and 
one was heard in the Ninth Circuit. 
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Finally, three major types of common-law claims appear in the cases: 
privacy torts, non-privacy torts (typically negligence), and other claims 
(such as breach of contract). Privacy tort claims were both most successful 
and least-often asserted: 72% of the twenty-nine cases asserting privacy 
torts were permitted to go forward.153 The other categories fell below the 
overall standing rate of 54% in all cases analyzed (52% for non-privacy 
torts and 51% for other common-law claims). 
This empirical analysis supports many of the ideas advanced in Part I. 
Low standing rates in data breach cases suggest that federal courts are 
unduly skeptical of the risk of harm flowing from data breaches, 
particularly in the aftermath of Clapper. The c  ke ici m ld 
also account for the relatively low rate of standing in non-privacy tort 
cases. Judicial skepticism about harm also appears to be borne out by the 
relatively low rates of standing in cases asserting statutory privacy and 
consumer protection claims. It is telling, for instance, that courts 
dismissed a large majority of FACTA claims for lack of standing. Among 
other things, FACTA instructs retailers not to print more than the last five 
digi  f a e n  c edi   debi  ca d n mbe  n a ecei .154 For reasons 
passing understanding, many retailers appear to be in breach of that 
requirement.155 Congress explicitly adjudged that printing more than the 
last five digits of a card number presented a risk to consumers, and enacted 
FACTA with the intended purpose of helping to combat identity 
hef . 156 Yet most federal courts to confront the issue have substituted 
hei  n ie  f ha m f  C ng e , finding allega i n  f FACTA 
i la i n  in fficien l  c nc e e   imminen    anding.157 
Conversely, where plaintiffs sue under statutes, and particularly federal 
statutes, that more strongly imply culpable behavior by defendants, courts 
find standing more often federal wiretap and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) claims stand as by far the most successful.158 These 
types of framing differences should, in theory, have no impact on the 
standing analysis. That they do confirms judicial misapplication of 
the doctrine. 
                                                     
153. Privacy tort claims in non-data-breach cases were particularly successful, with a standing rate 
of 88%. In data-breach cases, privacy torts fared less well, but still better than data-breach cases not 
involving privacy tort claims (54% vs. 47%). 
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). 
155. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fred s, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2018) ( [The 
plaintiff] . . . ecei ed a ecei  ha  di la ed he fi  i  digi  and he la  f  digi  f [ hei ] debi  
ca d. ). 
156. Id. (quoting Wood v. J Choo USA, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2016)). 
157. See id. at 1258 71.  
158. Only two of the cases analyzed asserted state law wiretap claims, but it is interesting to note 
that courts found standing in both. 
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4. Jurisdictional Variations 
If uniform application of the law is a goal of the federal judicial system, 
data-protection cases show the courts falling well short. The data reveal 
substantial variation in approach and adjudication at the district level. 
Given that data-protection cases typically involve technology 
companies and online services, it is unsurprising that the Northern District 
of California is the leading venue for data-protection cases, issuing thirty-
seven decisions on standing in such cases since Clapper. The court has 
also proven reasonably plaintiff-friendly, finding standing in twenty-five 
of those thirty-seven cases (68%).159 The second most frequent venue, the 
Northern District of Illinois, has been much less solicitous, finding 
standing in only six of eighteen cases (33%) analyzed. Reliance on 
Clapper is a significant point of distinction between these districts: the 
California court cited Clapper in only twelve of the thirty-seven (32%) 
data-protection cases analyzed, while the Illinois court cited it in eleven 
out of eighteen (61%). 
Figure 6: 


















                                                     
159. The large number of cases in the Northern District of California yields the only two judges 
issuing five or more opinions on standing in data-protection cases. Judge Koh leads the way with nine 
decisions; in light of her thorough analysis of Clapper in In re Adobe Systems, it is no surprise that 
she found standing existed in eight (89%) of these cases. Judge Davila, by contrast, found standing in 
only two of seven (29%) of the cases he decided. 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
2020] DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY 1231 
 
No other courts appear nearly so frequently in the data, but interesting 
trends emerge from the handful of repeat players. For example, among 
courts issuing five or more decisions on standing in data-protection cases 
since Clapper, most tend strongly in one direction or another on the 
question of standing. On the one end, in addition to the Northern District 
of California, both the Northern District of Georgia and Southern District 
of New York have been friendlier to plaintiffs, finding standing in seven 
of eight and nine cases, respectively, while the Seventh Circuit found 
standing in six of seven cases and the Third Circuit found standing in all 
five cases it decided. At the other end, the District of Columbia outdid the 
Northern District of Illinois, finding standing in none of the six cases it 
decided.160 This tendency perhaps exemplifies the role of path dependence 
in individual courts. 
C. Contributing Causes 
The data show that a number of factors Clapper, justification for 
standing, etc. are directly correlated with federal courts dismissing data 
protection cases at the standing stage. In addition to the direct correlations 
found in the data, this Article demonstrates numerous potential 
contributing factors that find support in the data, case law, and other 
scholarship. Leading factors include path dependence, the policy 
preferences of judges, and simple ignorance. 
1. Path Dependence 
The above data analysis strongly suggests harmful path dependence is 
at work in data-protection cases. At its most basic level, path dependence 
is the notion that earlier decisions constrain future decisions.161 Path 
dependence is a defining feature of a common-law system: previous 
decisions of the higher courts are binding on future decisions of the lower 
courts. Past decisions, even when not binding, are given persuasive effect 
in present cases. And stare decisis counsels that courts should stick to the 
path if reasonably possible. 
The system has built-in drawbacks, among them that the first decisions 
on a given issue are disproportionately impactful and that it therefore 
                                                     
160. A handful of courts deciding five or more cases were more varied in determining standing: 
the Central District of California and the District of New Jersey (both, three of eight), the District of 
Minnesota (two of five), and the Southern District of California and the Ninth Circuit (both, three of 
five). 
161. Hathaway, supra note 138, at 103 04 (defining path dependence as the idea that an c me 
or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the hi ical a h leading  i ). 
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incentivizes races to the courthouse.162 These issues may well be at play 
in the data-protection context. In data-protection litigation, some of those 
early choices raise serious concerns, effectively poisoning subsequent 
development in the doctrine. The direct and largely unquestioned adoption 
of Clapper in the data-protection context is a ready example. Another 
fascinating example is found in a line of cases in the Northern District of 
Illin i  in l ing Illin i  Bi me ic Inf ma i n P i ac  Ac  (BIPA) ha  
emerges from a troublingly non-adversarial context. 
BIPA is a (for now) unique statute. As explained by the Illinois 
Supreme Court, BIPA 
imposes numerous restrictions on how private entities collect, 
retain, disclose and destroy biometric identifiers, including retina 
or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, scans of hand or face 
geometry, or biometric information. Under the Act, any person 
agg ie ed  b  a i la i n f i  i i n  hall ha e a igh  f 
ac i n again  an ffending a  and ma  ec e  f  each 
i la i n  he g ea e  f li idated damages or actual damages, 
reasonable attorney fees and costs, and any other relief, including 
an injunction, that the court deems appropriate.163 
In recent years, it has apparently become commonplace for employers 
to use fingerprinting systems for time-tracking: rather than clocking in 
and out with a punch card, ID, or the like, employees use their fingerprints. 
Man  f he e em l e  ha e n  heeded BIPA  n ice and di cl e 
requirements, leading to a wave of putative class-action lawsuits. Such 
lawsuits have led to a series of decisions from the Northern District of 
Illinois on standing, including, chronologically, the McCollough v. 
Smarte Carte, Inc.,164 Howe v. Speedway LLC,165 Dixon v. Washington & 
Jane Smith Community Beverly, 166 Goings v. UGN, Inc.,167 Aguilar v. 
Rexnord LLC,168 Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc.,169 Miller v. 
Southwestern Airlines Co.,170 McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage, 
                                                     
162. Id. a  105 (n ing ha  c  ea l  e l i n  f legal i e  can bec me l cked-in and 
e i an   change  and ha  he de  in hich ca e  a i e in he c  can ignifican l  affec  he 
ecific legal d c ine ha  l ima el  e l ). 
163. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1199 200. 
164. No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016). 
165. No. 17-cv-07303, 2018 WL 2445541 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018). 
166. No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018). 
167. No. 17-cv-9340, 2018 WL 2966970 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018). 
168. No. 17 CV 9019, 2018 WL 3239715 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018). 
169. No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2018). 
170. No. 18 C 86, 2018 WL 4030590 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018). 
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Inc.,171 and Colon v. Dynacast, LLC cases.172 
Over the course of these nine cases, the judges of the Northern District 
reached a loose rule for whether these allegations support standing: where, 
as in Dixon and Miller, the plaintiffs alleged that the employers disclosed 
fingerprint scans to third parties (usually payroll vendors), the plaintiffs 
alleged a sufficiently concrete injury for Article III purposes. In the 
remaining cases, which featured no allegations of disclosure, the courts 
declined to find standing. One of the later cases in the line, McGinnis, 
neatly mma i e  he in : All he  c  in hi  Di ic  ha  ha e 
considered whether a person suffers a concrete injury from the known 
collection and retention of a fingerprint, without disclosure to a third-
party, have answered the question n . 173 
Whether this distinction is correct174 is of secondary importance to how 
it was reached. At first blush, this is an ordinary series of cases in one 
district raising similar issues, with judges appropriately taking cues from 
each he  ea ning in rendering their decisions. But under the surface 
lies a crucial problem: nearly all these cases were decided in the absence 
of real argument by the parties. 
The problem lies in the posture of the majority of these cases: Howe, 
Dixon, Goings, Aguilar, Johnson, Miller, and Colon were all originally 
filed in state court, then removed to federal court by defendants. In most 
of them, the defendants then sought a merits dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) n he ba i  ha  he lain iff  e e n  agg ie ed  b  he 
violations of BIPA alleged a statutory-standing argument that plainly 
implicates whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing. Howe, the first 
of these cases to confront the conundrum, summarized the issues 
as follows: 
Procedurally, Howe finds himself in an awkward position. To 
cceed in hi  la i , he m  e abli h ha  he i  a e n 
agg ie ed  h  ha  a  anding  a e  a ca e f ac i n 
under BIPA. However, if he has a cognizable injury under BIPA, 
then it follows that he also has constitutional standing and must 
proceed in a disfavored forum. Therefore, in an effort to achieve 
                                                     
171. 382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
172. No. 19-cv-4561, 2019 WL 5536834 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2019). 
173. McGinnis, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 819 (first citing Johnson, 2018 WL 3636556; then citing 
Aguilar, 2018 WL 3239715; then citing Goings, 2018 WL 2966970; then citing Howe, 2018 WL 
2445541; and then citing McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108). 
174. Under the analysis in Part I, the presence or absence of disclosure to a third party appears to 
be a distinction without a difference. The statutory violation is complete without such disclosure, and 
the courts  reasoning as to why hi  ba e ced al i la i n  d e  n  ffice i  emi ed n, and 
ffe  he ame defec  a , he Se en h Ci c i  deci i n in Gubala. 
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remand without fatally undermining his claims, Howe declines to 
take a position on constitutional standing and argues that it is 
Defendan  b den  e abli h such standing. . . . To avoid 
remand, Defendants find themselves having to establish that 
Howe has suffered a sufficient injury for purposes of Article III 
standing even as their motion to dismiss vigorously contests the 
adequacy of his injury for purposes of statutory standing.175 
In other words, this posture is a disaster, particularly for a 
determination of standing. As discussed above, the most powerful 
j ifica i n f  he d c ine  a lica i n in da a-protection litigation is 
to ensure the existence of an adversarial context in which all pertinent 
issues of fact and law can be brought before the court. Yet even without 
that vital clash of argument, the judges of the Northern District were 
compelled to rule on standing, because standing is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite and a federal court must always ensure it has jurisdiction, 
even if it requires raising issues of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own 
motion and resolving them with or without assistance from the parties.176 
Even assuming the most impartial and thorough approach by these 
judges, they reached decisions in these cases in exactly the manner the 
common-law judicial system and the doctrine of standing are meant to 
avoid. Worse, the problem is compounding. Howe and Dixon were 
decided on the same day.177 Goings came next and relied on Howe and 
Dixon in assessing standing.178 Aguilar, in turn, relied on all three,179 then 
Johnson incorporated Aguilar, and so on.180 This is an example of what 
Hathaway call  inc ea ing e n  a h de endence,  in hich nce a 
court makes an initial decision, it is less costly to continue down that same 
                                                     
175. Howe, 2018 WL 2445541, at *3 4. 
176. See, e.g., Dixon, 2018 WL 2445292, a  *4 (n ing ha  he c  ha  an inde enden  bliga i n 
 en e ha  i  ha  bjec  ma e  j i dic i n ). 
177. Howe and Dixon were each decided on May 31, 2018. Howe dismissed the action for lack of 
anding de i e n ing ha  [d]efendan  nd b edl  i la ed BIPA if he  failed  ide H e 
disclosures and obtain his written authorization prior to collecting and storing his fingerprints and did 
n  c ea e  make blicl  a ailable a bi me ic da a e en i n and de c i n lic .  Howe, 2018 
WL 2445541, at *7. Dixon, on the other hand, declined to dismiss on standing grounds. Dixon, 2018 
WL 2445292, at *10. 
178. Goings, 2018 WL 2966970, a  *2 (ci ing he f eg ing in a ing ha  [ ]hi  ca e j in  he 
growing ranks of BIPA actions filed in this district and elsewhere in which courts have adjudicated 
the sufficiency of the complaint against challenges brought under Rules 12(b)(1) and/  12(b)(6) ). 
179. Aguilar v. Rexnord LLC, No. 17 CV 9019, 2018 WL 3239715, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018) 
(ag eeing i h he anal i  in he f eg ing in a e ing he e i n [ f anding] in he c n e  f 
an em l e  bi me ic cl cking em ). 
180. Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 
2018) (citing the foregoing in support of holding that the plaintiff lacked standing). 
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a h han i  i   change  a diffe en  a h. 181 
The ultimate negative impact of following this tainted path can be seen 
in Rivera v. Google, Inc.,182 another BIPA case decided in the Northern 
District of Illinois. Unlike the line of cases discussed above, Rivera did 
not involve forced use of fingerprinting systems by employees. Rather, it 
challenged a fea e  f G gle Ph : G gle c ea ed face-ge me  
scans of individuals tagged in photos uploaded to the Google Photos 
service, then used the scans to identify and tag those individuals in other 
photos.183 This practice, in addition to being alarming, violated BIPA due 
 G gle  fail e  ide n ice f,  obtain consent to, the practice. 
Yet the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing.184 The 
c  ea ning incl ded eliance n he hi d-party disclosure 
distinction elucidated in the employee fingerprinting cases, expressly 
relying on the non-adversarial decisions in Howe, Miller, and Dixon.185 
This is a frightening example of path dependence gone awry. Path 
dependence is only a desirable feature of the common-law system as long 
as there can be confidence that the decisions against which future cases 
will be judged are reached fairly. Such confidence is lacking when judges 
are at sea in reaching their decisions, in cases in which neither party 
wishes to articulate a position.186 
Nor is the problem likely to stop at the Illinois border. Numerous state 
legislatures are considering biometric privacy laws like BIPA.187 To the 
                                                     
181. Hathaway, supra note 138, at 106 07. 
182. 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
183. Id. at 1001. 
184. Id. at 1014. 
185. Id. at 1008 09. 
186. Indeed, in McGinnis, the district court essentially forced the defendant to move under 
Rule 12(b)(1) instead f 12(b)(6). The defendan  iginall  a ed ha  i  a  g ing  file a m i n 
 di mi  he c m lain  f  lack f anding,  b  hen ed  c ncede he anding i e and 
filed a motion to dismiss [the case] as time-ba ed.  O de  a  1, McGinni  . U.S. C ld S age, Inc., 
382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 17 C 08054), ECF No. 24. The court, noting its 
inde enden  bliga i n  en e ha  i  ha  bjec  ma e  j i dic i n over a case before deciding 
he me i ,  de ed defendan   file a i i n a e  ha  ei he  a g e  ha  McGinni  ha  ade a el  
alleged Article III standing or expressly concedes the issue . . . . If [defendant] concedes standing, 
then McGinnis shall file a position paper that argues in support of standing . . . .  Id. at 1 2. Only 
after this express order did the defendant move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Incredibly, after the plaintiff refiled his suit in Illinois state court, the defendant sought to remove the 
case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, swapping positions on standing in the second 
round. The case was again dismissed for lack of standing. See McGinnis v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 
No. 19 C 00845, 2019 WL 7049921 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2019). 
187. See Eric J. Shinabarger & Alessandra V. Swanson, Several States Considering Laws 
Regulating the Collection of Biometric Data, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. BLOG 
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-corner/several-states-considering-laws-
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extent that such laws resemble BIPA,188 it will be natural for litigants to 
point to the Northern District of Illinois decisions construing BIPA, and 
for other judges to accord some respect to those decisions.189 This 
poisoned precedent could thereby hinder application of these new laws.190 
2. Policy Preferences 
Analysis of the case law suggests that standing dismissals in data-
protection litigation are driven by a range of judicial policy preferences, 
ranging from substantive skepticism about privacy to concerns about 
docket management. 
a. Skepticism About Privacy 
Man  anding deci i n  be a  j dge  ke ici m ab  i ac  
harms, ranging from failure of imagination to outright hostility.191 Judicial 
skepticism about privacy may have sociological and psychological roots. 
Lior Strahilevitz notes that me 20% f he la i n a e i ac  
nc nce ned ; ha  i , he  a e indi id al  n  al ing hei  n i ac  
and having a difficult time understanding why anyone would care about 
privacy . . . . 192 He further notes that extroverts who are more likely to 
be privacy unconcerned play an outsize role in public life, including in 
policymaking and serving as leaders in business and government.193 Some 
Article III judges, each of whom must go through an extensive and public 
                                                     
regulating-the-collection-of-biometric-data.html [https://perma.cc/5T8V-WHUA]. 
188. And it is likely that they will. See, e.g., id. (noting, for example, that proposed New York law 
is b an iall  imila   BIPA ). 
189. Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion of Rivera, affirming the 
presence of standing in a nearly identical lawsuit against Facebook. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 
F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 937 (2020). 
190. To end this analysis on an appropriately Kafkaesque note, Rivera distinguished a previous 
Northern District of Illinois finding standing arising from collection of face scans in violation of 
BIPA. One of the bases of the di inc i n: i  al  d e  n  a ea  ha  he a ie  eci el  eed  
hi  i e f  he di ic  c  in ha  ca e, a  he defendan  did n  challenge he lain iff  anding.  
Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1014 n.19 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
191. The Supreme Court itself indulged in such skepticism in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, with Justice 
Ali  ining ha  [i]  i  diffic l   imagine h  he di emina i n f an incorrect zip code, without 
m e, c ld k an  c nc e e ha m.  __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). As Wu notes, this 
type of speculation usurps the function of the legislature, which determined the practice to be 
sufficiently harmful to be worth banning. See Wu, supra note 15, at 459. 
192. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 
2026 (2013). 
193. Id. ( If he i ac  nc nce ned a e indeed m e di ed  a ici a e hea il  in he li ical 
process, with privacy fundamentalists tending to remain on the sidelines in political debates, the 
malle  g  ice in lic  deba e  ma  be j  a  l d  e en l de  han he la ge  c h . ). 
 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
2020] DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY 1237 
 
vetting process, may be among that group that places less value on 
privacy. When confronted with the opportunity to evaluate the risk of 
harm, they might be expected to express skepticism about privacy harms, 
particularly those in cases of improper data collection or retention. 
Concerns about psychology-based skepticism arise from the 
ch l gical c nce  f m i a ed ea ning : a endenc   ie  m e 
skeptically claims that n c n e   ne  n ie  and e e ience .194 
The endenc  a d ke ici m i  f e en l  nc n ci , n  
c n ci . 195 And it may offer at least a partial explanation of, for 
example, Gubala, in which Judge Posner a very public figure in his 
decades on the bench opined that a plaintiff whose personal information 
has been retained by a private company in direct violation of federal law 
for over a decade has nevertheless suffered no harm.196 
It is possible, too, that judges in data-protection litigation are motivated 
by conscious, substantive views. This phenomenon is readily observable 
in cases with a substantially political character; many are the Supreme 
Court cases whose outcome can be predicted as five to four decisions on 
conservative-liberal lines.197 It may also account for the skepticism 
expressed by many judges when evaluating the likelihood that a particular 
data-protection violation may lead to harm. Take, for example, numerous 
cases in which judges do not heed the requirement to construe allegations 
in the light most favorable to the non-movant in evaluating studies of harm 
following data breaches, and take the curious position that there is no 
standing even though a substantial percentage of the proposed class will 
suffer identity theft, turning the notion of expected value on its head.198 
                                                     
194. Fallon, supra note 13, at 1098 (describing m i a ed ea ning a  he endenc  f  m  f 
us . . . to look skeptically on factual assertions as well as arguments that contradict our prior, 
ide l gicall  ff ed e  f belief ). 
195. Id. 
196. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017). Nichol presents a similar 
a g men , c n ending ha  [a]  eli e j dge  mma il  de e mine hich in e e  a e h  f legal 
cognizance, they unsurprisingly embrace concerns that strike clo e   h me, aining ha m  ha  
mi  he e e ience  and edilec i n  f hei  n li e .  Nich l, supra note 13, at 304. In a similar 
vein, Ma he  T k n n e  ha  c  e amina i n f kn ledge end   be b ad and ab ac  
a he  han a ic la ,  and ha , [i]n he F h Amendmen  c n e , c  d  hi  b  eaching a 
conclusion about the collective knowledge possessed by society and then imputing that knowledge to 
he e n a  i e.  Ma he  T k n, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 139, 150 (2016). 
197. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1095 96 ( [T]he J ice  b an i e c n i i nal ie  
inevitably drive standing decisions in a number of important areas. Abundant examples confirm this 
he i . ). 
198. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 76 (4 h Ci . 2017) ( E en if e c edi  he 
Plain iff  allega i n ha  33% f h e affec ed b  D n VAMC da a b eache  ill bec me ictims 
f iden i  hef , i  f ll  ha  e  66% f e e an  affec ed ill ffe  n  ha m. ); In re SuperValu, 
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These judges appear to hold the view that privacy harms are not real 
harms, and rule accordingly. 
b. Pro-Business/Anti-Consumer Bias 
Two broad, related trends likely exacerbate problems in data-protection 
litigation. First, [i]n he a  fif een ea , lain iff  a e l ing, and 
business defendants are winning, a huge majority of Federal Rules private 
enforcement cases . . . . 199 Second, courts have been increasingly hostile 
to class actions.200 Almost all data-protection lawsuits in federal court fall 
into those buckets. Few are the data breaches affecting, or the data-
gathering schemes targeting, only a handful of individuals. And standing, 
although not literally a Federal Rules issue, is a similar type of procedural 
inquiry. The frequently successful challenges to standing in data-
protection litigation especially the low standing rates in consumer 
protection cases are less surprising when considered in light of 
these trends. 
Both these broad trends and the specific context of data-protection 
litigation exemplify the concern that standing doctrine works to favor 
those with power and privilege.201 While a full accounting of the factors 
underlying that tendency is beyond the scope of this Article, troubling 
parallels to retrenchment in private enforcement actions exist. For 
example, one study notes a substantial increase in amicus filings by pro-
business and conse a i e g  in he S eme C  cla -action 
cases since 1994, particularly noting increased activity from the Chamber 
of Commerce, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Washington Legal 
Foundation, and the Defense Research Institute.202 Each of those groups 
filed amicus briefs in Spokeo, as did numerous businesses and credit 
                                                     
Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586, 2018 WL 1189327, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 
7, 2018) (evaluating report stating that approxima el  40% f indi id al  h e ca d n mbe  e e 
c m mi ed in 2013 became f a d ic im  and c ncl ding ha  hi  e  e abli he  ha  he 
majority of consumers whose payment cards are compromised in a breach will not become fraud 
victims as a result f he b each ). 
199. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against 
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1518 (2017). 
200. See, e.g., id. at 1518 21 (finding that pro-class action outcomes at the Supreme Court have 
substantially declined since the late 1980s). 
201. Nichol, supra note 13, at 304. Nichol argues that the standing doctrine ema icall  fa  
the powerful over the powerless. The malleable, value-laden injury determination has operated to give 
g ea e  c edence  in e e  f i ilege han  ide  claim  f di ad an age.  Id. 
202. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 199, at 1525 (analyzing impact of increase in amicus 
filings on Supreme Court class-action jurisprudence). 
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bureaus.203 In the legislative sphere, technology companies have lobbied 
against developing privacy laws.204 Increased responsiveness of courts 
and legislators to these special interests helps explain low standing rates 
in data-protection litigation and the absence of legislative action to combat 
judicial hostility to data-protection claims. 
c. Docket Management 
The Seventh Ci c i  ma  ha e aid he ie  a   l d: The 
standing rule reduces the workload of the federal judiciary . . . . 205 While 
literally true, that is neither an accepted nor acceptable justification for 
standing doctrine.206 The e i ence f a Ca e   C n e  d e  n  
depend on how pleased the court will be to hear it. Article III does not 
give the judiciary the ability to set its caseload. And a dispute will be no 
le  ad e a ial be een he a ie  if i  i  he en h hea ing n a c  
calendar rather than the first. Indeed, around the time that the Supreme 
Court threw standing jurisprudence for a loop in Clapper, it admonished 
that federal courts are obligated to hear cases falling within 
their jurisdiction.207 
Yet the appeal of the standing dismissal to the federal judge is 
impossible to ignore. The massive and increasing caseload in the federal 
courts is well known. In the data-protection context, cases typically 
promise to be long and involved. Most arise from large-scale data 
breaches or inappropriate, indiscriminate data collection. As such, they 
are usually brought as class actions and implicate complex technical 
issues. One can certainly understand why overworked judges might be 
eager to get such cases off their dockets. 
With that in mind, dismissal for lack of standing has a special appeal 
over other means of dispensing with a case: it is a non-merits dismissal. 
Even if erroneous or improperly motivated, a dismissal for lack of 
standing works relatively little injustice, as its effect is only to banish the 
                                                     
203. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Supreme Court Docket No. 13-1339, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13-1339.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2FF2-YUMD]. 
204. See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang California s Landmark Privacy 
Law, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-law-tech-
lobby-bills-weaken/ [https://perma.cc/Q4WL-9PYW] (discussing lobbying efforts to undermine the 
California Consumer Privacy Act). 
205. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 2017). 
206. Wu characterizes the Gubala court s reliance on a fea  f being fl ded  i h li iga i n a  
a in e en iall  legi la i e  de e mina i n. See Wu, supra note 15, at 458. 
207. See Le ma k In l . S a ic C n l C m nen , Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) ( [A] fede al 
c  bliga i n  hea  and decide ca e  i hin i  j i dic i n i  i all  nflagging.  (in e nal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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suit to state court. Moreover, as the data show, state-law and common-law 
claims predominate in data-protection litigation the majority of cases 
analyzed involved such claims, while fewer than half of cases asserted 
claims under federal law. Allowing state courts to deal with state-law 
claims is a hallmark feature of the federal system, CAFA notwithstanding. 
The N he n Di ic  f Illin i  BIPA e ie  f ca e  ma  ceed 
from this impulse. Most were brought initially in state court, then removed 
to federal court by defendants who seemed intent on challenging 
lain iff  igh   b ing i  a  all. C nf n ed i h he ec  f 
overseeing a lengthy, complicated class-action lawsuit brought by 
plaintiffs who did not want to be in federal court in the first place against 
defendants who appeared to be engaging in gamesmanship, the judges of 
the Northern District of Illinois may well have viewed dismissal for lack 
of standing as the best of all possible worlds. 
The data are potentially consistent with this explanation. In particular, 
appellate courts have been significantly more solicitous of plaintiffs in 
data-protection cases, finding standing in 75% of cases, compared to only 
51% of district courts. In data-breach cases, which likely present both the 
most technically complicated inquiries and the most diffuse harms, 
appellate courts upheld standing in 79% of cases, compared to a mere 41% 
of district court cases. 
Figure 7: 
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Figure 8: 
Standing Outcome at Circuit Court 
 
3. Ignorance 
Perhaps more innocent, but equally troubling, is the prospect that 
federal judges believe there is no substantial risk of harm in data-
protection cases because they do not understand issues like aggregation of 
information from multiple sources and non-monetary harm flowing from 
privacy violations. 
Tha  di ic  c  j dge , and i e ibl  lain iff  la e , d  n  
understand the problem posed by aggregation is revealed by how little 
treatment the subject receives in the case law. And those few cases that do 
engage with the idea inspire little confidence. For example, in Cooper v. 
Slice Technologies, Inc.,208 the plaintiffs brought a proposed class action 
against Slice, which operated a service called UnrollMe. UnrollMe 
purported to serve its users by accessing a e  email acc n , canning 
it for spam messages, and unsubscribing users from further such 
messages.209 The seasoned observer of privacy practices will not be 
                                                     
208. No. 17-CV-7102, 2018 WL 2727888 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018). 
209. Id. at *1. 
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i ed  lea n ha  Un llMe  ac al b ine  m del a   can he 
email accounts to which it was given access and then ell an n mi ed  
data gleaned therefrom to third parties, thereby enabling more and 
different spam to be sent to its customers.210 
In alleging the harmful nature of this practice, the plaintiffs argued that 
research has shown that purportedly anonymized information can be 
trivially de-anonymized.211 Plaintiffs emphasized that the types of 
messages UnrollMe harvested included Lyft ride receipts, which are even 
more susceptible to de-anonymization than many other types of emails as 
they include start points, destinations, ride times, unique customer 
identifiers, and other information.212 But the district court tried to cleave 
he e allega i n  in   di inc  e  f ha m: elling n n-anonymized 
da a,  hich he c  f nd  be he m  c nc e e ha m,  and ha  
UnrollMe sold anonymized emails, but in such a way that the buyers could 
en iall  dean n mi e  he da a and nc e  e nal inf ma i n. 213 
The c  in e e ed lain iff  allega i n  nde  he fi  in   be that 
Un llMe ld he e  email add e ,  and f nd hem in fficien  
beca e i  a  n  nece a il  he ca e ha  he email add e  a  
incl ded in he an n mi ed da a e  ha  Un llMe ld. 214 As to de-
anonymization, the court pared down the complaint to allegations  
(1) that [r]esearchers have revealed the ease [with] which 
particular people can be identified from purportedly anonymized 
data sources,  particularly for taxi trips, and (2) that Uber, one of 
Un llMe  clien , ha  a le -than-sterling reputation for 
snooping on customers. But the mere possibility that someone 
migh  dean n mi e Plain iff  email  i  n  en gh  c n i e 
injury in fact.215 
This crabbed reading of the complaint betrays, at best, a 
misunderstanding of the import of aggregation in data protection. The 
lain iff  c nce n i  n , a  he c  ed, ha  Ube  migh  be able 
to divine the email address of a customer from the data sold to it by 
Un llMe. Ra he , he gi  f lain iff  allega i n  i  in fac  ha  he pes 
of emails UnrollMe harvested and sold to third parties include types of 
information that make it very easy to identify individuals, even if their 
names or email addresses are redacted. In particular, a third party might 
                                                     
210. Id. 
211. Complaint at 12, Cooper, 2018 WL 2727888 (No. 17-CV-7102). 
212. Id. at 13. 
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easily glean details about individuals from their Lyft rides, such as home 
and work locations, schedules, and so forth. That information could, in 
turn, subject an individual to great harm.216 
Whether a federal court would view even that larger risk of harm as 
sufficient to confer standing is, unfortunately, not clear. But at the very 
least, greater understanding of the risks in play in data-protection 
litigation should lead to better outcomes. 
Ignorance of the harms in data-protection litigation may also arise from 
common fallacies. Ignacio Cofone and Adriana Robertson, for instance, 
have studied the impact of the cognitive bias known a  n n-belief in the 
la  f la ge n mbe  (NBLLN) n i ac .217 This bias describes the 
fact that afflicted individuals underestimate how informative each 
marginal item of information disclosed will be.218 While Cofone and 
R be n f c  n e laining he i ac  a ad , 219 this bias would 
al  infl ence a j dge  a e men  f i k in a da a-protection case.220 
Taking Cooper again a  an e am le, he c  inion certainly admits 
of the possibility that it does not realize how much information can 
accurately be deduced from Lyft ride data.221 
Th gh anal i  f he fede al c  deci i n  in da a-protection 
                                                     
216. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 104, at 1705 ( Acc e i e eiden ifica i n make  all f  ec e  
fundamentally easier to discover and reveal. Our enemies will find it easier to connect us to facts that 
they can use to blackmail, harass, defame, frame, or discriminate against us. Powerful reidentification 
ill d a  e e  ne f  cl e   ha  I call  e nal da aba e  f in. ). 
217. Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral World, 69 
HASTINGS L.J. 1471 (2018) (arguing in favor of regulation of consumer data based on cognitive 
biases). 
218. Id. at 1489 90 (n ing ha  he a e age e n i  n  a ic la l  g d a  e ima ing he 
inf ma i ene  f each iece f ne l  a i ing inf ma i n,  and if he ffe  f m NBLLN, he 
will underestimate how much  ha  iece f inf ma i n di cl e  (em ha is in original)); see also id. 
(n ing ha  an indi id al migh  mi akenl  belie e ha  [a hi d- a ] belief ab  hei  e nal 
information does not change much when they provide the [third-party] with new information that is, 
in fact, still informati e ). 
219. A  he   i , [ ]hi  a ad  can be mma i ed b  he f ll ing e i n: h  i  i  ha  
individuals consistently indicate that they value privacy, while simultaneously giving their privacy 
a a  f  alm  n hing?  Id. at 1476. 
220. Relatedly, Nash notes that courts assessing probabilistic injuries may fundamentally 
mi nde and he anal i : S me j dge  d  n  ee ha  a mall risk of a significant harm is the same 
as a certain loss of a harm of a smaller magnitude, and . . . that since the latter is a sufficient basis for 
anding   h ld be he f me .  Na h, supra note 15, at 1310. 
221. As another example, in Antman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the district court found substantial 
risk of harm did not exist despite allegations that defendant had lost information about the plaintiff 
incl ding hi  name, d i e  licen e inf ma i n, and hi  bank acc n  and ing n mbe ,  n he 
basis that this was not enough information to plausibly enable fraud or identity theft. No. 15-cv-
01175-LB, 2018 WL 2151231, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018). No attention was given to the 
possibility that this information might trivially be tied to other information available about plaintiff 
or the possibility of harms beyond fraud and identity theft. 
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litigation reveals numerous flaws and inconsistencies in handling the 
standing inquiry. The data support various plausible explanations for these 
errors and may point the way toward appropriate corrective measures. 
III. CORRECTING COURSE 
In previous Parts, this Article showed that federal courts systematically 
err in assessing standing in data-protection litigation. By analyzing 
hundreds of these cases, this Article identified numerous factors 
contributing to these errors, from choices about precedent to ignorance 
about key factual issues. It now turns to normative points. 
Increasing liability for data gatherers and brokers who violate law is 
desirable. Among other things, putting these entities on the hook for 
gathering and losing information will incentivize stronger protection 
while deterring overcollection. To get there, courts will have to administer 
the standing inquiry differently in data-protection litigation than they have 
to date. 
This Part begins by suggesting methods to increase the percentage of 
data-protection cases that survive standing challenges, including 
reframing the standing inquiry and the potential effects of legislative 
action. It then discusses the implications of allowing more cases to go 
f a d, incl ding ealigning da a ga he e  incen i e  and ad ancing 
development of federal law. Theoretically, it contributes to the growing 
literature of data protection that argues for stronger protection of private 
information at the design and enforcement stages. 
A. Reframing the Standing Inquiry 
If the pathology of problems with standing doctrine in data-protection 
litigation can be traced to a single source, the leading candidate appears 
to be failure to grapple with the purpose of standing doctrine in assessing 
whether standing exists in a particular case. Examining the allegations in 
any given data-protection lawsuit from those principles will rarely support 
any Article III-based objection to jurisdiction, no matter how skeptical 
any given judge might be about privacy harms. Conversely, when analysis 
is unmoored from its purpose, courts, for the reasons discussed above, 
reach results that conflict with the purposes of Article III. The data 
suggest that courts are indeed at sea in most cases when assessing 
standing, as they typically resort to rote application of the three-part test 
with no discussion of its purpose. Returning to the adversity-based 
justification for standing as the foundation of standing analysis in data-
protection litigation would lead to more consistent, coherent, and 
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salutary outcomes.222 
To do so would require express recognition by the federal courts that 
standing must be evaluated differently in different cases. The courts have 
done so implicitly in their approach to other types of cases, such as those 
implicating the Establishment Clause.223 Explicitly acknowledging that 
the doctrine applies differently in different types of cases would enable 
more thoughtful examination of the issues.224 
Reframing the harms in data-protection litigation may also lead to 
improved outcomes. Approaching lawsuits solely from the standpoint of 
substantive rights and harms invites exactly the type of judicial skepticism 
against which this Article argues. By contrast, viewing data harms as 
violations of private procedural rights could simplify the inquiry around 
standing. In Lujan, for example, the Supreme Court noted that procedural 
igh  a e ni e: The e n h  ha  been acc ded a ced al igh  
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all 
he n mal anda d  f  ed e abili  and immediac . 225 
Data protection is a perfect candidate for this kind of treatment. 
Construing data protection as a private procedural right would give force 
to statutory and common-law restrictions on gathering, using, and selling 
data that are too often disregarded by courts today but are intended to 
ec  indi id al  c nc e e, b an i e in e e  in a iding iden i  
theft or exposure of private information. In the data-breach context, 
similar rights should be considered implied in the relationship between 
individual and data holder. It is hard to imagine that an individual would 
willingly agree to turn over their private information to an entity that had 
no intention to protect it. By implying a right to have data holders use 
reasonable care in protecting information they have acquired, the 
reasonable expectations of individuals and their ability to obtain redress 
for violations of those expectations are advanced.226 
                                                     
222. A corollary suggestion would be to move away from analyzing standing in any given case 
with reference to Clapper and instead focus on precedent in a closer context than that presented in 
Clapper. 
223. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1071 75 (analyzing the Supreme Court s Establishment 
Clause standing jurisprudence). 
224. See, e.g., id. at 1107 08 ( [The Supreme Court] ought to recognize that what counts as an 
injury depends on the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit. This modest, clarifying recognition 
would bring increased transparency to divisions about standing. Moreover, it should provoke no 
emba a men , ei he   he C  in i i nall    an  f he J ice  indi id all . ). 
225. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
226. The Ninth Circuit took an important step down this path in its decision on remand in Spokeo 
by agreeing with the Second Circuit that Spokeo stands for the i i n ha  an alleged ced al 
violation [of a statute] can by itself manifest concrete injury where Congress conferred the procedural 
igh   ec  a lain iff  c nc e e in e e  and he e he ced al i la i n e en  a i k f 
 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
1246 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1193 
 
Relatedly, passage of a federal data-privacy law could turn the tide. 
Thi  A icle  da a h  fede al c ts are more likely to find standing in 
cases asserting violations of federal statutes.227 While the specific 
authorization for a cause of action should not matter in conducting the 
standing inquiry, better to use this systemic error to improve outcomes 
than to ignore its existence. Such a law could make explicit requirements 
for reasonable care in protecting information. Even purely technical 
violations of the law would likely suffice for standing under the analysis 
e  f h in he Nin h Ci c i  ec nd Spokeo decision. 
B. Implications of Increasing Liability for Data Gatherers 
Holding data gatherers to account for their wrongdoing should benefit 
those who are wronged, realign data-gathering incentives to be more 
socially beneficial, and contribute to development of federal law on 
data protection. 
Intuitively, the more data-protection cases that survive challenges to 
standing, the more frequently data gatherers will be held liable or pressed 
to settle in the wake of their wrongdoing. That intuition finds support in 
the literature. A study of litigation following data breaches from 2000
2010 shows substantially higher settlement rates in cases where plaintiffs 
allege ac al ha m, ing a na  defini i n f ac al ha m  ha  ack  
closely with the analysis in Part I c nce ning fede al c  e em ha i  
on PII.228 The d  f nd ha  lain iff allega i n  f financial ha m a e 
correlated with a 30% increase in the probability of settlement . . . . 229 
By reframing what constitutes actual harm, both at the standing stage 
and into the merits, more cases should result in settlement rather than 
dismissal. Thus, more frequent findings of standing in data-protection 
litigation will lead to more frequent redress for individuals who suffer 
privacy harms. Even recognizing that significant merits challenges remain 
in data-protection litigation once standing is established, as more cases go 
                                                     
eal ha m  ha  c nc e e in e e .  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
227. See supra section II.A.3. 
228. Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data 
Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 95 96 (2014). The  define ac al ha m  f  
e  f anal i  a  he e he lain iff  c m lain  allege  an ac al l  d e  he b each (e.g., 
if the plaintiff alleges fraudulent charges on a credit card, stolen money from a checking or savings 
acc n ,  he  ch c  inc ed f m c iminal ac i i ).  Id. O he  f m  f alleged ha m ch 
as preventive costs from credit monitoring, emotional distress, invasion of privacy, or 
emba a men  a e not considered actual harm. Id. 
229. Id. at 98. 
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forward, more successes (or good settlements) will follow. 
Increasing liability for data holders would also lead to two related 
benefits: increased incentive to protect data and decreased incentive to 
gather or hold it. The current balance in litigation does not adequately 
incentivize businesses to protect the data they are holding, since they stand 
a good chance of escaping liability in the event of a breach. In fact, they 
are incentivized to extract every bit of data they can, even if to do so 
violates law, because they know they likely will not be held to account. 
Indeed, at least one study has found that technology companies are not 
concerned about privacy, instead focusing their resources in other areas.230 
Shifting the balance toward liability should deter marginal collectors and 
spur those for whom data brokerage remains viable to expend more 
resources on security.231 It may also help  a e  i ac  la  lide 
toward legal endogeneity by making it less feasible for businesses to hide 
behind showy compliance mechanisms that have no real force.232 
Allowing more cases to go forward should also at least clarify the 
merits challenges in data-protection cases. For example, the causation 
conundrum identified by some courts in the standing context whether to 
wait until identity theft actually occurs to sue, at the risk of defendants 
arguing that another intervening data breach is the cause foreshadows a 
merits issue that can be expected to arise in most data breach cases. The 
fact that approximately half of all data-protection cases and more than 
half of data-breach cases filed in federal court are being thrown out 
before reaching the merits substantially slows the development of case 
law addressing these critical issues. 
Additionally, more merits cases may help to rescue privacy law from 
being overtaken by consumer contract law. Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior 
Strahilevitz, among others, have noted the significant role played by 
contractual relationships in privacy suits.233 While many data-protection 
                                                     
230. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 685 86 (2018) 
( Enginee  king a  a -  didn  eall  hink ab  i ac .  N  did he e ec i e , f  ha  
matter. Larger companies that say they take privacy seriously had a different problem: prioritization. 
Privacy was simply not a top p i i  f  enginee  beca e i  a  c ded  b  he  manda e .  
(footnote omitted)). 
231. A robust federal data-protection law would arguably do better in achieving these goals. But 
the dream of such a law is no reason to delay correctives in the judiciary. 
232. See Ari Ezra Waldman, P i ac  La  Fal e P omi e, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 778 (2020) 
( A  m e echn l g  c m anie  ain  c ea ive pictures of their legal compliance, lawyers and judges 
become more likely to defer to the toothless structures companies create by either accepting them as 
evidence of substantive adherence to the law or actually incorporating them into statutes, thereby 
nde mining he ca aci  f  la   achie e m e b  i ac  ec i n  f  e .  (f n e 
omitted)). 
233. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting Over Privacy: 
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cases play out in the shadow of terms of service, myriad cases arise in the 
absence of any such relationship.234 Permitting more of these cases to go 
forward should lead to increased development of privacy law at the 
federal level. 
One concern, of course, is that allowing more cases to clear the 
standing bar would increase the workload of the federal bench. However, 
the feared flood of litigation may not come to pass. One cannot lose what 
one does not gather, and one cannot be sued for what one has not lost (or 
gathered improperly). More litigation should decrease incentives to gather 
data, which should therefore lead to fewer violations and fewer suits. 
These changes to the law and the incentives it creates would also help 
remedy the distributional effects of current standing doctrine. As this 
Article discusses, the present balance appears to favor corporate interests 
and to denigrate harms like anxiety as unworthy of judicial attention. 
Recognizing that these types of harms are cognizable in federal court 
should shift that balance. Moreover, even if merits decisions begin to go 
against data-protection plaintiffs, those decisions may highlight gaps in 
existing law and serve as a rallying point for policy advocacy. Examples 
f hi  hen men n ab nd, ch a  he ecen  enac men  f a e enge 
n  la  in Ne  Y k. While man  hed f  enac men  f ch a la  
for years, a 2014 criminal case crystallized some of the shortcomings of 
existing New York law.235 Advocates such as the Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative highlighted that decision as an example of the failings of 
harassment law to curb non-consensual pornography, and argue for 
reshaping the legal landscape to better protect the interests of women by 
treating non-consensual pornography as a privacy issue236 leading, in 
                                                     
Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (2016) (examining various interactions between contract law and 
privacy issues). 
234. Point-of-sale breaches are a ready example, as there are typically no terms of service presented 
or agreed to in a retail transaction. Moreover, tech firms  increasingly voracious appetite for data 
leads to situations in which lawsuits arise in the absence of a contractual relationship. For example, 
the Google Photos face-scan case, Rivera, involved two named plaintiffs one a Google Photos user 
subject to Google s terms of service, but the other a friend of a Google Photos user.  
235. See Emma Grey Ellis, New York s Revenge Porn Law is a Flawed Step Forward, WIRED 
(July 24, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-revenge-porn-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/T9CA-229Y] (discussing case dismissing harassment claim in hich [a] man 
allegedly shared nude images of his gi lf iend n T i e  and en  hem  he  famil  and em l e  
beca e Ne  Y k la  a  ha  ime define[d] ha a men  a  di ec  c mm nica i n i h he ic im ). 
236. See, e.g., Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, E al a ing Ne  Yo k  Re enge Po n  La : 
A Missed Opportunity to Protect Sexual Privacy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/evaluating-new-yorks-revenge-porn-law-a-missed-opportunity-
to-protect-sexual-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/MK38-NEPN] (highlighting problems with treating 
revenge porn as a harassment issue rather than a privacy issue); see also Danielle Keats Citron & 
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) ( O  
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a ,  he na ing f he ga  in Ne  Y k  ha a men  la . Thi  e 
of pattern could play out if courts adjudicating the merits of data-
protection suits continue, for whatever reason, to indulge in skepticism 
about data-protection issues. In short, one way or the other, developing 
fede al la  n i ac  ill hif  he la  e e i n, and he blic 
should respond accordingly.237 
C. Theoretical Approach 
Focusing on the leading Supreme Court and appellate decisions on 
standing in data-protection litigation leaves too much on the table. Data 
takes many forms, and so too the litigation arising from its use, misuse, 
and loss. Courts can and do tinker with what they consider precedential in 
any given case. Thus, this Article proceeds from the belief that 
examination of a much broader set of cases enables new insights into the 
standing quandary. From those insights, it seeks to push the federal 
judicial system back onto a particular path taking seriously the 
applicable purpose of standing doctrine in adjudicating standing 
challenges. Adopting that approach would have consequences beyond the 
sphere of data-protection. While other areas of law are beyond the scope 
of this Article, it is plausible to suggest that a more explicitly nuanced 
approach to standing in all cases would yield more accurate decisions than 
the current inquiry, which might fairly be deemed one-size-fits-none. This 
type of approach might also diminish the potential for judges to hide 
preference-motivated decisions on standing behind that opaque inquiry. 
Additionally, although this Article shows the connection between 
Clapper and denials of standing is strong, it can show only correlation 
rather than causation. Some judges undoubtedly feel they are bound by 
the reasoning and approach set forth in Clapper. Others may reach to 
Clapper to justify skepticism about the harms asserted in a particular case. 
The motivating factors discussed in section II.B suggest that the latter 
situation occurs more often than might be desired. Either way, this Article 
hopes to remedy the issue to some extent by laying bare Clapper  lack f 
connection to data-protection litigation. 
None of this should be read to sugge  ha  fi ing he fede al c  
                                                     
society has a poor track record in addressing harms that take women and girls as their primary targets. 
Though much progress has been made towards gender equality, much social, legal, and political 
power remains in the hands of men. The fight to recognize domestic violence, sexual assault, and 
sexual harassment as serious issues has been long and difficult, and the tendency to tolerate, trivialize, 
 di mi  he e ha m  e i . ). 
237. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2025 (1996) (arguing that he e e i e f nc i n f la  make  m  en e in c nnec i n i h eff  
 change n m ). 
Haley (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2020  6:24 PM 
1250 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1193 
 
approach to standing in data-protection litigation (or elsewhere) is a 
panacea, nor that every data-protection lawsuit is meritorious. Rather, this 
Article seeks to offer solutions to a threshold problem, a necessary step 
on the path to enable a substantial shift in the treatment of private 
information in both theory and practice. 
Connected to that goal is the question of whether private enforcement 
can or will move the needle. There is reason to believe that it could. 
Waldman, for instance, finds that regulatory action has had some success 
in inducing industry to emphasize privacy more strongly in their design 
activities.238 Private enforcement could have a similar impact. In light of 
he FTC  ecen , idel  c i ici ed esolution of privacy issues with both 
Facebook239 and Equifax,240 more robust private enforcement becomes 
even more attractive. These lackluster settlements suggest deep capture is 
a  k, dimini hing he FTC  a e i e and abili   eg la e ind  
players sufficiently.241 
CONCLUSION 
By looking beyond the relative handful of cases studied in existing 
li e a e, hi  A icle  c m ehen i e a ach iden ifie  emic 
e e  ha  c n ib e  he c  e ne  deci i n  in da a-
protection litigation. Most notably, those pressures include widespread 
overreliance on case law with little application to the issues posed by data-
protection lawsuits and failure to consider the purpose of standing 
doctrine in administering the inquiry. It then proposes new solutions 
tailored to those systemic pressures, most importantly the need for federal 
                                                     
238. See Waldman, supra note 230, at 665 66 ( [C] m anie  h  ha e been he bjec  f ng 
regulatory intervention are more successful at embedding the importance of consumer privacy into 
de ign. Thi  en  a a h a  f  ing b  FTC enf cemen   make a diffe ence. ).  
239. See, e.g., Challenge to FTC/Facebook 2019 Settlement, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (2019), 
https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/epic2019-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/W57A-RYFA] ( [The 
FTC  e lemen  i h Faceb k] d e  n  incen i i e Faceb k  fi  i  dee l  blema ic b ine  
model and practices. Instead, the e lemen  fail   meaningf ll  limi  Faceb k  c llec i n, e, 
and ha ing f c n me  da a  im e an  ac all  inde enden  e igh  e  Faceb k  e f 
personal data. On the whole, the settlement is not meaningfully different from the 2012 Consent Order 
ha  ed  be ef ll  inade a e in he ake f Faceb k  c n in ed i ac  i la i n  f m 
2012  he e en . ); see also id. (collecting political and media criticism of the settlement). 
240. See, e.g., Rachel Siegel, Did Someone Fo ge  o do he Ma h?  Con me , Ad oca e  Rail 
Against Lowered Equifax Cash Payouts, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2019, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/01/did-someone-forget-do-math-consumers-
advocates-rail-against-lowered-equifax-cash-payouts/ [https://perma.cc/44TH-TSK5] (discussing 
c i ici m f di ib i n f e lemen  f nd  in E ifa  e lemen  i h he FTC). 
241. See Cohen, supra note 15, a  555 ( Dee  ca e or capture at the level of ideology
proceeds as well-resourced repeat players work to craft compelling narratives about the contours of 
legal en i lemen  and he c e f legal in i i n . ). 
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judges to reorient their approach to the standing inquiry by focusing on 
the need to preserve adversarial presentation of the issues. Resolving the 
systemic errors in decisions on standing should advance the goal of data 
protection by permitting additional lawsuits to go forward, thereby better 
aligning private incentives with the public good. 
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